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Abstract 
Data and statistics about crime and human rights violations are incomplete and biased, 
yet numbers are in high demand. Advocates and policymakers often tally up available, yet partial 
data and present them as hard numbers to bring attention to abuses and to influence aid and 
accountability. As calls for transparency about data limitations increase, I ask two related 
questions: 1) How do human rights advocates think about the value of quantification and its 
associated uncertainty when using it to inform and influence audiences? 2) With respect to 
quantitative evidence about violence, crime or abuse, how do different presentations of data 
uncertainty affect decision outcomes?  Using mixed methods – qualitative and experimental – 
this research teases out the political, behavioral and methodological challenges that advocates 
face as they collect, communicate, and deploy violence statistics in global and local human rights 
advocacy contexts.  
Semi-structured interviews with twenty-eight frontline human rights advocates (focused 
on global, U.S., or Colombian issues) reveal that data uncertainty is an unavoidable reality in 
human rights work, and advocates are keenly aware of this. Advocates mostly share consistent 
and as-of-yet unrecognized ideas and practices about what could be called “good enough 
numbers” for advocacy. Central to these practices are pragmatic, yet principled tradeoffs that 
pull advocates away from strictly rigorous treatment of data and uncertainty. Transparency is a 
key issue that advocates somewhat reluctantly reduce in pragmatic considerations of benefits and 
risks.  
 
   xiii 
 
The survey experiment employed three vignettes and four uncertainty messages, designed 
on the basis of science communication theory and human rights communication practices, to 
explore the impact of “being transparent” about data limitations. Responses from 970 college 
graduates confirm that 1) numbers have strong anchoring effects, but also show that 2) simple 
caveats about uncertainty do little to de-anchor decision-making. The research also finds novel 
evidence that 3) only one message type – called here “expert interception” – effectively drives 
people to account for uncertainty in their decisions (replicating earlier findings about 
communicating uncertainty in weather forecasting (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013)). Finally, 4) while 
different studies suggest perceptions of trustworthiness of information providers may increase, or 
decrease, with different levels of uncertainty information, this study finds minimal fluctuation in 
source trust across any of the tested uncertainty messages. 
Information providers face a clear choice in allowing numbers to speak for themselves or 
proactively mitigating bias through language – a choice that is inherently political. It appears that 
uncertainty is most effectively conveyed when communicators intercept the power of numbers to 
project “mechanical objectivity” with their expert knowledge about the data generation process 
and data limitations. A core theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the elucidation of a 
“rigor-pragmatism continuum” – a novel framework informed by the research findings. The 
continuum challenges the good-bad dichotomy that is common in critiques of human rights 
numbers and offers an alternative to support more nuanced analysis about how human rights 
advocates wrestle with using uncertain numbers. As a whole, this dissertation has wide-reaching 
implications for human rights and science communication scholarship and practice.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Collecting fact-based evidence to increase the likelihood of providing attention to 
atrocities, remedies for victims, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, as well as justice, 
reconciliation, and non-repetition, energizes much of the work in the human rights (HR) 
community today (Alston & Knuckey, 2016). In this context, scholars and advocates point out 
that quantitative data such as body counts, crime statistics, and data about abuses and abusers are 
in high demand to inform and influence decisions on behalf of vulnerable groups (Andreas & 
Greenhill, 2010; Cohen & Green, 2012; Langford & Fukuda-Parr, 2012; Merry, 2016; Root, 
2016; Rosga & Satterthwaite, 2009; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 2016). Although the “information 
politics” of transnational organizations have long been central to the human rights advocacy 
movement (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), now more than ever, statistics, figures, and aggregate trends 
hold the promise – or perhaps just the veneer – of serving as powerful packages of objectivity in 
international, politicized, and adversarial contexts (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Merry, 2016; 
Porter, 1995).  An inherent feature of the “seduction of quantification” is the elimination of 
uncertainty somewhere along the line from information production to consumption (Merry, 
2016).  
But the “seduction of quantification” faces limitations that are due, in part, to the inherent 
uncertainty in data about political violence, crime, and human rights abuses. These phenomena 
are hard to document for many reasons: perpetrators have strong incentives to eliminate evidence 
of their crimes, impede efforts to collect evidence, and hinder access to the evidence that does 
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exist (Guberek & Hedstrom, 2017; Leiby, 2012). People and organizations working to document 
and collect such evidence may encounter silence from victims and witnesses (Roth, Guberek, & 
Green, 2011). In addition, data producers may themselves choose silence given the risks and 
high costs associated with collecting data such as testimonies, documents, and administrative 
records. In many cases, violence exceeds our capacity for documentation. In short, data and 
statistics about crime and mass violence rarely represent reality; they are almost always 
incomplete and biased in non-random ways that we cannot easily infer because ground truth (i.e., 
what actually happened) is almost never attainable (Davenport & Ball, 2002; Guzmán, Guberek, 
& Price, 2012; Kruger, Ball, Price, & Green, 2013; Landman & Godhes, 2013; Price & Ball, 
2015b; Weidmann, 2016; Williams, Bowman, & Jung, 2016). 
In human rights scholarship, the way statistics are produced and used has become a topic 
of critical inquiry. Due to their simplified form and the often unverified assumption that 
quantitative experts have produced the numbers, audiences tend to “mechanically” read numbers 
as objective (Porter, 1995). Porter aims to conceptually uncouple the conflation of objectivity 
from “truth,” arguing instead that objectivity in numbers should be understood more as a 
procedural “distance from subjectivity” based on universal rules for the production of 
quantification.  Merry finds that nonetheless the “seduction of quantification” is palpable in 
human rights governance forums as “the idea that indicators offer a particularly reliable form of 
truth” (p.26). The problem is exacerbated given that with the “turn to metrics,” embedded 
uncertainty in data falls away somewhere along the line from information production to 
consumption (Langford & Fukuda-Parr, 2012; Merry, 2016; Rosga & Satterthwaite, 2009). 
Scholars from different disciplines, who employ a variety of research methods, are concerned 
with data quality and the relationship between data and the phenomena that they represent. This 
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“data uncertainty” is often rendered invisible and effectively eliminated when observational 
information about complex social phenomena is reduced to numeric form. Given the inherent 
limitations to observing and documenting violence, crime and abuse, I focus here on this most 
initial form of uncertainty that enters the quantitative knowledge production pipeline. 
Scholars are sending cautionary messages about bias in data, algorithms and statistics in 
the human rights field, and much beyond (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Goldstein, 1986; O’Neil, 2016; T. B. Seybolt, Aronson, & Fischhoff, 2013; Tufekci, 2014). In 
the human rights realm, there is a growing concern that overly confident quantitative claims and 
failure to present underlying data uncertainty to information consumers can lead to real 
consequences: undermine the credibility of organizations (Cohen & Green, 2012), amplify racial 
and socio-economic bias in criminal justice decision-making (Lum & Isaac, 2016; Starr, 2014), 
enable funneling of attention and resources to only the most visible problems, distort scholarly 
knowledge production (Landman & Godhes, 2013), and privilege certain narratives over others 
(Kruger et al., 2013; Price & Ball, 2015b; Reydams, 2016; Weidmann, 2016). Overall, these 
issues can run counter to the historical clarification and broader truth-telling project of the human 
rights community. 
Due to these concerns, scholars from across disciplines are calling for more transparent 
communication of data limitations to audiences, especially when important decisions are at stake 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; Greenhill, 2010; O’Neil, 2016; Root, 2016; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 
2016; Tufekci, 2014). Given the expertise, cost, and difficulties often involved in calculating 
statistical bounds of uncertainty (Fariss, 2014; Kruger & Lum, 2015; Price & Ball, 2015b; T. B. 
Seybolt et al., 2013), an alternative recommendation to practitioners has been to “confront 
limitations and bias [in data] through language” (Root, 2016, p. 364).  The underlying idea here 
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is that by expressing uncertainty, the communicator offers complementary information to 
audiences that can buffer against false precision in interpreting quantitative information. This 
call for transparency naturally aligns with the truth-telling agenda of the human rights 
community.  
However, at present, we know little about what these tensions mean for human rights 
practitioners, nor how they view or manage them in their current communication practices. 
Scholarly commentary often portrays HR advocates with these data dilemmas as using “bad 
data” liberally to advance their causes (Best, 2012; Cohen & Green, 2012). Disclosure about data 
quality appears to be minimal: Simone and Satterthwaite (2016) reviewed the methodology 
sections in ten years of advocacy reports by two leading human rights NGOs and find that 
descriptions on the difficulty of data collection were “unusually abbreviated,” and discussed in 
less than one third of all the reports produced in 2010 (p. 325). Heinzelman & Meier (2013) 
suggest that any acknowledgement of data limitations around numbers tends to be in the form of 
empty caveats, and Ball (2016) suggests that the notion that caveats help readers calibrate their 
consumption of numbers is a “fallacy.”  
Cognitive science and science communication scholarship reveals that communicating 
uncertainty effectively in any domain is not straightforward. Research from disparate scientific 
fields provide scattered insights on the challenges of communicating uncertainty. Cognitive 
studies show that better decision outcomes emerge from numerical expressions of uncertainty 
than linguistic ones (Budescu, Por, & Broomell, 2012; Budescu & Wallsten, 1987; Joslyn & 
LeClerc, 2013; K. A. Martire, Kemp, Watkins, Sayle, & Newell, 2013); that making explicit 
recommendations to decision-makers in the face of uncertainty is likely to lead to improved 
outcomes (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013; Joslyn, Nadav-Greenberg, & Nichols, 2009); that “hedges” 
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can increase perceptions of credibility of information providers (Jensen, 2008), but can also 
weaken the perceived value of evidence in court (Kadane & Koehler, 2018; K. Martire, Kemp, 
Sayle, & Newell, 2014).  
Yet even in these other domains, the findings on communicating uncertainty are isolated 
and sometimes contradictory, and the relative degrees to which uncertainty messages affect 
decision-making and perceptions of credibility in the sources remain unknown. Therefore, 
despite the growing attention to data problems and speculation about its consequences, there is 
little hard evidence that communicating data uncertainty sways decisions one way or the other. 
Until now, in human rights scholarship, while there is a growing desire for more explicit 
communication of data uncertainty, how to understand the science and politics of such 
communication remains an open challenge.  
1.1 Research Questions and Methods 
 
While we know some about the appeal of quantification and the problem of uncertainty, 
this dissertation research aimed to answer two open, overarching questions: 
 
1. How do human rights practitioners think about the value and impact of 
quantitative evidence and its associated uncertainty when communicating it to inform and 
influence audiences?  
2. When presented with quantitative evidence about violence, crime, or abuse, how 
do different presentations of data uncertainty affect decision outcomes?  
 
To answer these questions, I conducted a mixed methods study. For the first question, I 
conducted a qualitative interview study. I interviewed frontline human rights practitioners who 
provide or receive quantitative ‘facts and figures’ about crime or violent events in their daily 
work. I explored their views on the value of data and quantitative information in achieving their 
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goals; their perceptions of the limitations in the data they use to make numeric claims; their 
practices for navigating data uncertainty; the language they use (or not) to present data and 
uncertainty. In a complementary way, the qualitative research helped me understand the broader 
context and the feasibility of adopting different communication practices about data and 
uncertainty.  
Next, I isolated and tested the impact of four theoretically distinct ways to communicate 
data uncertainty in typical human rights decision-making scenarios using an online experimental 
survey.  Participants considered three vignettes and answered survey questions on decisions and 
trust perceptions, as well as various other outcomes measures. Each treatment consisted of a 
different type and way to communicate the provenance of the data and its limitations. The 
qualitative and experimental research were sequenced in such a way that allowed me to draw 
rich and complementary insights for the dissertation as a whole (Creswell & Clark, 2011). The 
survey experiment on communicating data uncertainty conducted here is the first of its kind in 
the human rights literature. Finally, it is worth noting that the overall study is also informed by 
over a decade of my own professional experience working in the human rights community, 
conducting data-based research and advocacy.  
1.2 Findings and Contributions 
Aiming to contribute to the growing scholarship taking a critical look at the use of human 
rights statistics, this research makes at least six empirical findings. First, I learn through my 
interviews with human rights advocates that data uncertainty is an unavoidable reality in human 
rights work, and human rights advocates are keenly aware of this. Second, human rights 
advocates are generally conscientious about wanting to avoid presenting or citing “suspect facts” 
(Cohen & Green, 2012, p. 446).  One key way they do this is by making use of what I call “good 
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enough numbers,” which I find to be a shared set of pragmatic, yet principled choices that pull 
advocates away from strict rigorous treatment of data and uncertainty. Third, human rights 
advocates consider various political and cognitive risks of “being transparent” about data and 
methods. Transparency about methods and data uncertainty is a key issue that advocates 
somewhat reluctantly suggest gets reduced to minimal form in pragmatic considerations of 
benefits and risks. Most reason that minimal transparency aligns with audiences’ expectations, 
thus poses little risk to their  institutional credibility – an intuition bolstered by the experimental 
results which yield minimal fluctuation in the source trust measure across treatments and 
controls. Forth, also via the survey experiment, I find that the message type I call “expert 
interception” is the only one to consistently attenuate the strong anchoring effect of biased 
numbers. The message, informed by similar findings in scholarship on communicating 
uncertainty about weather forecasts, anticipates audiences’ tendency to read numbers as falsely 
precise and warns them about how such an interpretation will impact the decision outcome. In 
essence, expert interceptive messages intentionally ask audiences to engage with the information 
providers’ expertise about the data production instead of mechanically placing their trust in the 
numbers. Fifth, among most advocates included in the interview study, trust in institutional 
authority appears to matter more than quantitative expertise. Finally, the experimental findings 
make clear that information providers face a clear choice to be made between allowing a number 
to speak for itself or being proactive about mitigating bias. Ultimately, human rights advocates, 
or anyone using numbers they know to be uncertain, must contend with this inherently political 
choice.  
Drawing on insights about the role of quantification in society from previous scholars 
(e.g., Jasanoff, 2014; March & Simon, 1958; Merry, 2016; Porter, 1995), I formulate a new 
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model to analyze the practical trade-offs that advocates face when considering to use uncertain 
data to advance their work. While prevailing debates about numbers in human rights tend to 
judge uncertain numbers as “good” or “bad” (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Best, 2012), I believe 
a rigor-pragmatism continuum is better suited to analyzing how advocates regularly and 
conscientiously wrestle with when and how to use less-than-perfect numbers. Nonetheless, I find 
the key weakness to advocates’ rationale to be the context-specific temporality they see in “good 
enough” numbers for advocacy. The short-term utility of “good enough” numbers contrasts with 
the unavoidable fluidity, anchoring effect, long-term staying power, and reuse of numbers.  
I hope this research can be of service to human rights practitioners. As they work to be 
influential in an increasingly data driven world, I appeal to posterity as one important reason why 
investing in rigorous practices and increased transparency about methods and data uncertainty is 
worthwhile. While valuing the complex tradeoffs that advocates make to advance their agendas, 
rigor can nonetheless serve as a North Star for the community. 
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Chapter 2 Literature and Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation builds on insights from diverse fields including science and technology 
studies, human rights, and science communication. In this chapter, I first examine the theoretical 
literature explaining the source of power of numbers in society, as well as some critical work on 
how that power easily facilitates the misuse of numbers. I find some scholars make a stark 
distinction between “good” and “bad” statistics which I argue may be an unhelpful framing for 
human rights statistics that are plagued with inherent and unresolvable data uncertainty. I define 
data uncertainty as the set of issues that make data have a hard-to-specify relationship with 
reality. I then review the literature on the production and use of human rights statistics and the 
existing recommendations on how to handle inherent data uncertainty about hard-to-document 
events of crime, violence, and abuse. Taking seriously recommendations that call for more 
transparent communication of data uncertainty, I analyze theories and empirical research from 
cognitive science and science communication fields about the ways and impacts of 
communicating uncertainty. I close with a synthesis of open questions related to communicating 
uncertainty about human rights violations data – open questions that motivate and inform this 
dissertation research.  
2.1 The Power of Numbers 
Quantification is an attractive form of communication in public life (Porter, 1995). In his 
seminal book Trust in Numbers, Theodore Porter theorizes that the power of numbers is based 
less on their accuracy and more on their form: they conveniently summarize complex 
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information in adherence to universal, standardized rules that are recognizable across time and 
space. For this reason, he argues, numbers serve as communication ‘technologies of distance,’ 
whereby audiences need not rely on the subjective authority of the information provider and can 
instead rely on the authority of the universal rules that underlie the process of producing 
numbers.  Number are seen to be “objective” not because of their relationship with truth in 
nature, but because of their distance from the subjective opinion of the information provider. 
Ultimately, numbers project “mechanical objectivity,” as it is assumed that experts rigorously 
follow the rules that ensure a check on subjective opinion and personal bias (even though, he 
says, “the rigor and uniformity nearly disappear in relatively private and informal settings” (ix).  
Rigor here is the idea that rules for proper quantification are judiciously followed and enforced 
by disciplinary peers (Jasanoff, 2014; Marquart, 2017).  Overall, numbers serve as an 
information consensus where more proximate social and political connections are lacking – 
allowing them to transcend gulfs of trust among people and communities. By virtue of their 
simplified, unambiguous form and utility at a distance, numbers also afford incontestability, i.e., 
once produced, the compressed package of mechanical objectivity is difficult to reverse engineer 
and becomes relatively stable in its authority. As such, numbers have been found especially 
valuable to support decision-making in otherwise politicized environments (Porter, 1995, p. ix). 
Empirical scholars have confirmed quantification to command significant authority in fields such 
as criminal justice (Hannah-Moffat, 2013; Starr, 2014), law enforcement (Brayne, 2017), global 
governance (Merry, Davis, & Kingsbury, 2015), and human rights (Merry, 2016; Root, 2016; 




Keck and Sikkink (1998) define ‘information politics’ in advocacy work as “the ability to 
quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the 
most impact” (p.16). Scholars emphasize that for this reason, numbers are in high demand in the 
human rights community. With the “turn to metrics,” advocates and policymakers feel an 
increased pressure to produce numbers. Some scholars have been studying how practitioners 
work with this pressure (Cohen & Green, 2012; Langford & Fukuda-Parr, 2012; Merry, 2016; 
Rosga & Satterthwaite, 2009). For example, Cohen and Green (2012) believe numbers have 
taken on added prominence in recent years as human rights advocates rely less on targeting 
select bad actors for traditional “naming and shaming” campaigns and more on emphasizing the 
gravity of human rights crises to multiple audiences. Merry (2016) depicts how advocates and 
policymakers working to measure on sexual violence and human trafficking team up with 
technical experts to produce and provide numbers in global governance forums like the United 
Nations and the U.S. State Department. She highlights a kind of pragmatism at work: despite 
contested political debates to determine the categories to classify  these acts and the recognition 
of inherent uncertainty, the imperfection and messiness in the available information get washed 
away when indicators are produced and used. Root (2016) explains that human rights advocates, 
who tend not to be quantitative experts and instead have relatively low “quantitative literacy,” 
often feel pressure to provide numbers. From his experience as Quantitative Analyst at Human 
Rights Watch, he considers that advocates “will produce and publish estimates of ‘dark figures’ 
when there is sufficient data and reasoning in calculation” (p.365). Emblematic of the pragmatic 
approximation to the data dilemmas, he writes “there is nothing inherently wrong with making 
an educated estimate when it is impossible to know the true extent of a phenomenon. It is 
 
12 
essential that any estimates be treated with all the caveats required and not treated as fact” 
(p.367).  
 
2.2 The Multi-faceted Problems with Numbers 
Ultimately, trust in numbers relies on trust in experts (and trust in experts relies on 
vetting by disciplinary communities). Scholars concerned with veneers of objectivity inherently 
worry that the public relies too much on assumptions and appearances of judicious rule-
following by experts even when those are not verifiable. As the demand and supply of numbers 
used to inform and influence public spheres has grown, scholars worry that “mechanical 
objectivity” leads to numbers being read with unquestioning trust, thus facilitating the 
propagation of “bad” numbers and misuse with little deterrence (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; 
Best, 2012). In his influential book “Damned Lies and Statistics,” Joel Best outlines how to 
distinguish “good” and “bad” statistics about social problems, a challenge complicated by what 
he calls the “public” and “hidden” power of statistics. The “pubic power” of statistics is that 
given the simplicity of their form, they “convert complicated social problems into more easily 
understood estimates, percentages, and rates.” Their “hidden power” is that they are used to 
support views. Together, their simple, unambiguous form and uncritical consumption, he argues, 
makes it easy for statistics to be used by activists as “ammunition for political struggles.” In their 
edited volume, Andreas and Greenhill (2010) include several case studies of the misuse of 
unfounded statistics in the international relations realm, citing the incentive for attention as the 




Best describes the multiple ways activists produce “bad statistics.” First, he writes, “bad 
statistics” can arise from guessing without data or from estimates with flawed data. Simple 
guesses tend to be intuitive, qualitative, or political assessments that a phenomenon is severe and 
widespread. “Bad numbers” can also be data-based and still be fraught with social, political, and 
epistemological challenges. He outlines three main data problems: 1) The definitions for what is 
to be counted are often vague – too broad or too narrow, leading to counts that include false 
positives or false negatives. 2) Counting rules and measurement instruments are manipulatable 
and opaque. 3) Data samples can be unrepresentative, but are nonetheless used to make 
inferences and generalizations. The issues he raises as constituting “bad” statistics include a wide 
range – from guesses to various data problems. The data problems are especially difficult to deal 
with for data about complex social problems like human rights violations.   
Best goes on to describe other classes of “bad statistics” which stem from innumeracy or 
deliberate manipulation. These can take forms such as inappropriate generalization, 
misrepresenting the meaning of otherwise “good” statistics, garbling complex statistics, or 
making inappropriate comparisons. Typical consumption of numbers based on trust (trust in 
numbers which bakes in trust in experts, i.e., Porter) rather than on verification enables the 
unchecked circulation of such statistics.  Echoing some of the issues raised by Best, Cohen and 
Hoover Green (2012) describe the misuse of statistics by advocates who are quick to publish 
unverified and exaggerated claims, such as the claim that 75% of women experienced sexual 
violence during Liberia’s civil war between 1989-2003. They hypothesize more broadly that 
human rights advocacy organizations face “dueling incentives” when making quantitative 
claims: the need to impel “drama” in the short-term (for which there is the strong temptation to 
guess and exaggerate, i.e., misuse statistics in Best’s vocabulary) versus the need to maintain 
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credibility in the long-term. Interestingly, Slovic et al. (2013) find psychological numbing effects 
when people face increasingly high numbers of mass atrocities, ultimately weakening their 
strength at compelling action.  
All the issues raised in Best’s “good vs. bad” framework are important. However, they 
include a heterogenous mix of issues – from unsolvable social, technical and epistemological 
challenges with data to wholly unfounded numbers being naively or intentionally propagated. In 
my view, putting all these issues in the same problematic bucket may not be the most helpful 
way to understand and address some of the underlying tensions with the inherently partial and 
biased nature of data about human rights violations. In this study, I uncouple the largely 
unsolvable data problems from the politics that may incentivize misuse. I start with the basis that 
numbers about human rights violations are usually, if not always uncertain. I will focus on 
analyzing how advocates manage the tension between uncertainty inherent in data and the 
politics of human rights advocacy.  
2.3 Data Uncertainty  
On the challenges of producing reliable data about human rights violations (HRVs), there 
is an ever-increasing body of empirical work demonstrating how HRVs are extremely difficult to 
document and measure: perpetrators try to conceal abuse, violations are hard to observe, victims 
comprise a “hidden” population, and different logics of access, trust, changing and limited 
resources. (Ball & Price, 2018; Cohen & Green, 2012; Davenport & Ball, 2002; Fariss, 2014; 
Guzmán et al., 2012; Hall & Stahl, 2008; Kruger et al., 2013; Landman & Godhes, 2013; Lum & 
Isaac, 2016; Roth et al., 2011; Weidmann, 2016). For any or all of these reasons, data tend to be 
biased towards what is known of groups who already tend to be disproportionately visible. 
Unrecognized bias threatens inferential endeavors (Eckhouse, Lum, Conti-Cook, & Ciccolini, 
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2019; Price & Ball, 2015a; T. B. Seybolt et al., 2013; Weidmann, 2016). In addition, there are 
the politics of defining, classifying and counting such complex phenomena (Coomans, Grunfeld, 
& Kamminga, 2009; Merry, 2016; Rosga & Satterthwaite, 2009).  
The inevitable challenges in the process of attempting to measure HRVs means that 
almost all available datasets are flawed. Simple statistics on the basis of such data constitute 
what Best deems “bad statistics.” However, “bad statistics” may be too harsh a judgment, 
especially because there is little that can be done to change or improve such data. Even some of 
the most tenacious documenting efforts are plagued with bias (Price & Ball, 2015a). 
Rather than constituting “bad” data, one might consider HRVs data plagued by 
definitional, measurement, and sample limitations as having an uncertain relationship with the 
reality they are used to portray. Some scholars have called the uncertainty due to imperfect data 
“second-order uncertainty,” or simply ambiguity, referring to “uncertainty created by ‘the 
amount, type, reliability, and ‘unanimity’ of information and giving rise to one's degree of 
‘confidence’ in the estimate…” (Dieckmann, Mauro, & Slovic, 2010; Ellsberg, 1961). In this 
dissertation, I use the term ‘data uncertainty’ to refer specifically to the set of issues that result in 
imperfect data that, despite their limitations, are nonetheless used to make formal or informal 
inferences about the world. I use the term “uncertain numbers,” as distinct from the overly-broad 
term “bad numbers” to refer to numbers plagued by data uncertainty.  
2.4 Contending with Uncertain Data and Numbers  
Some of the scholars mentioned above make appeals to information producers and 
consumers about what to do in the face of overarching “bad statistics.” For example, Best 
appeals to information consumers to “become better judges of the numbers we encounter” (p.13). 
He urges people to evaluate who, why, and how the numbers were produced. Evaluating the 
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“who” asks consumers to verify that producers of numbers have expertise worth trusting. 
Evaluating the “why” asks consumers to look for “clues to the motivation” of the number 
provider (p.24). Evaluating the “how” asks consumers to look at the data and methods that 
produce the statistics, often requiring some minimal numeracy criteria. Overall, he asks the 
public to avoid being “awestruck,” “naïve,” or “cynical” consumers of social statistics, but to be 
“critical,” i.e., to expend some thought to distinguish between good and bad statistics. Andreas 
and Greenhill (2010) make similar appeals, arguing it “behooves consumers to think harder 
about sources of data, the conclusions they draw from these data, and the assumptions on which 
they are predicated” (p. 4). However, given that the power of numbers relies on information 
consumers’ “mechanical” assumptions of objectivity, such appeals may face an uphill battle. 
They essentially ask consumers to expend effort that will override the trust-in-numbers and trust-
in-experts heuristics most people rely on. Such appeals also beckon people to seek information 
about the back-story to the production of numbers which is often in low supply (as we will see 
below).  
In the human rights scholarship, experts have also been making appeals to information 
producers, largely based on their commitment to the rule-following required to make reliable 
quantitative claims. Critical scholars argue that using uncertain data to making quantitative 
claims could lead to consequences that jeopardize the broader truth project of the human rights 
community: they can amplify racial or demographic bias in predictive policing (Lum & Isaac, 
2016), distort historical narratives (Ball, Asher, Sulmont, & Manrique, 2003), favor impunity for 
certain actors (Reydams, 2016), and possibly hurt the long-term strength and credibility of 
human rights organizations (Cohen & Green, 2012; Greenhill, 2010; Root, 2016; Satterthwaite & 
Simeone, 2016).  
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Critical human rights scholars have made what I see as three recommendations to 
practitioners using uncertain data and statistics. The first is that given data uncertainty, any effort 
to produce numbers should draw on statistical methodologies that account for the uncertainty of 
data and produce inferential estimates and calculated bounds of uncertainty – essentially to ‘fix 
the data’ with rigorous social science (Ball & Price, 2019; Fariss, 2014; T. B. Seybolt et al., 
2013). ‘Rigor’ in this context usually means that quantitative claims are held to social scientific 
standards of quantitative research in the planning, data collection, analysis and reporting of 
findings, and it is in this methodological compliance and replicability that they derive their 
trustworthiness (Marquart, 2017; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 2016). However, advanced methods 
are only applicable under very specific conditions and require advance statistical expertise to 
calculate – expertise that is usually beyond the time, resources, or skills of typical a human rights 
project. The second recommendation is for practitioners to avoid using flawed data altogether to 
make descriptive, inferential, or predictive quantitative claims, i.e., to ‘drop the data’ (Andreas & 
Greenhill, 2010; Price & Ball, 2015b). As Andreas and Greenhill put it, advocates could just 
acknowledge that they “don’t know” the magnitude and patterns of phenomena (p.278). Lastly – 
and perhaps the most broadly applicable yet least understood option – is for human rights 
practitioners to transparently inform audiences about the origins of the data and their inherent 
uncertainty (Ball & Price, 2018; Greenhill, 2010; Merry, 2016; Root, 2016; Satterthwaite & 
Simeone, 2016). For example, Satterthwaite and Simone (2016) write “[i]ncreased transparency 
about methods, research procedures, and limitations, as well as increased attention to the 
evidence base for conclusions and recommendations, will ultimately support the human rights 
fact-finding community by ensuring its credibility and reliability” (p.345). Sally Merry calls 
more specifically for “clear warnings about the limitation of indicators, the problems of missing 
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or inadequate data, weak proxies, the generalization inherent in commensuration, and the loss of 
structural and systematic knowledge could improve indicator literacy” (p.217). Implicit in this 
last call is the idea that if information producers gave information consumers more information 
about the social, messy, and limited process of data production, consumers could better assess 
the quality, uncertainty, and reliability of the claims made on the basis of such data. In this way, 
transparency about data production and data uncertainty is seen as the path to ease some of the 
tension caught up in debates about the science and politics of using statistics to advance human 
rights.  
Overall, in this research, I find that fixing and dropping numbers are not practical 
alternatives, which I will show in Chapter 4 Qualitative Interview Findings. On the basis of 
interviews with practitioners, I analyze how practitioners currently manage using uncertain data 
for advocacy goals. The main research question explored in this study is about the viability and 
impact of transparent communication of data uncertainty. To do so, in the next section, I explore 
the current literature on data transparency.  
2.5 Transparency about Data  
“From philosophers concerned with the epistemological production of truth, through activists striving for 
government accountability, transparency has offered a way to see inside the truth of a system.” 
 
Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford, 2018, p.974  
 
Transparency entails that a system is made open to observation, usually for the purpose 
of giving more control to the viewer, ideally to enable accountability (Christensen & Cheney, 
2015).  In the ideal, “information is easily discernible and legible; that audiences are competent, 
involved, and able to comprehend” the information made visible (Christensen & Cheney, 2015, 
p. 74). In scientific communities, transparency means that the process behind any scientific claim 
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is available for other scholars to carefully evaluate. It means that the credibility of the claims 
should not be based on assumed expertise and discretion, but on a reviewable and rigorous 
research process (Lupia & Elman, 2014).  
In the human rights data context, the call for transparency is usually made as a benign 
petition aligned with best research practices. Nonetheless, the idea of accountability is inherent 
to such appeals – that transparency will allow audiences to better comprehend and ultimately 
judge the reliability of the information. With respect to data uncertainty, transparency is seen as 
pragmatic, compromising option to convey data limitations to audiences. A few scholars have 
taken a look at what transparency and disclosure of data limitations in human rights reports 
actually looks like. Satterthwaite and Simeone (2016) show how descriptions of data and 
methodological limitations are rare (although improving slightly over time) in reports by global 
human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Overall, they 
find “unusually abbreviated time periods for investigations or especially difficult-to-access target 
populations” (p.325). In the related criminal justice literature, Hannah-Moffat (2013) worries that 
“…sources of data used to complete risk assessments are rarely disclosed or known to the court; 
only the risk score is provided” (p.285). According to Heinzelman and Meier (2013), if 
practitioners do address uncertainty, they usually do not go so far as to provide information that 
would lead to greater comprehension. Instead, they see hints of disclosure in the form of 
“caveats,” carefully crafted short statements about the limitations of the data. Heinzelman and 
Meier posit that practitioners do this more in the spirit of protecting their credibility than of 
communicating uncertainty. Separately, Ball (2016) argues that the idea that caveats effectively 
communicate data limitations to audiences is a “fallacy.”   
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Some scholars point to a fallacy of the ideal of transparency more broadly. Ananny and 
Crawford (2018) offer ten limits to the transparency idea; two are especially relevant here: the 
idea that transparency can “privilege seeing over understanding” and the illusion that 
transparency builds trust (p.980). In the human rights community, the calls for transparency are 
broad: some call for more information about research methods for fact-finding; others make 
specific appeals about communicating uncertainty in data. However, the information required 
and the implications of these two are distinct. We know from science communication literature 
that communicating uncertainty it is rarely done (as I will review below). In the specific context 
of human rights measurement, Merry (2016) argues that in the global human rights community, 
the “seduction of quantification, the idea that numerical data offer a particularly reliable form of 
truth,” is inherently linked to the elimination of uncertainty (p.26).  She usefully evokes the idea 
of “uncertainty absorption” from March and Simon (1958) which “takes place when inferences 
are drawn from a body of evidence, and the inferences rather than the evidence itself, are then 
communicated” (p.165). As data get input, processed and output through the rule-making and 
number-producing pipeline, flawed or missing data, conceptual proxies, fuzzy definitions, the 
lack of commensurability and the political shaping of the categories for counting get 
pragmatically “stripped away” (Merry, 2016, p. 5). In theory then, communicating uncertainty 
that stems from the process of producing information may sit like an oxymoron next to 
quantitative information.  In human rights and much beyond, communicating uncertainty in data 
or scientific findings is thought to come with risks. As Brian Root, Quantitative analyst at HRW 
puts it, “[i]n general, I believe practitioners are uncomfortable with uncertainty….because it 
threatens their strength in a human rights project rooted in accuracy, veracity and integrity – the 
use of numbers with some level of uncertainty is seen to endanger accuracy” (p.365). However, 
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if the perceived persuasive power of numerical claims depend on methodological brevity or 
wholesale suppression of uncertainty (Lupia, 2013; Merry, 2016), and actors view uncertainty as 
a potential vulnerability (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Root, 2016), calls for communicating 
uncertainty may remain mute.  
At present, we only know little about the extent to which human rights practitioners 
contend and possibly mitigate the tension between an inevitably uncertain supply of information 
about HRVs, and the demand for authoritative numbers. We know less about how calls to be 
more transparent about data resonate in complex and politized real-world contexts. And, in the 
human rights context, if we are to take seriously the calls for more transparency about data 
uncertainty, what would such expressions look like and what is the impact of conveying them to 
audiences? To begin considering how to answer these questions, in the next section I review 
theoretical and empirical insights from scholarship on communicating science and uncertainty to 
inform my research design.  
2.6 Communicating Uncertainty  
Until recently, there was a general consensus across domains that authors should shield 
their audiences from uncertainty. This was partly due to: 1) the well-established idea that 
cognitively, people are poor at processing and making decisions with statistics and uncertainty 
(Kahneman, 2011), 2) the idea that people make decisions using motivated reasoning and 
heuristics based on source trust (Kahan, 2011), and 3) the belief that uncertainty brings 
vulnerability in adversarial or politicized environments, where it can be taken out of context and 
used against its providers and their scientific findings (Fischhoff, 2012; Oreskes & Conway, 
2010). More generally, the science communication literature finds little room for communicating 
uncertainty when attempting to be persuasive in politicized environments (Lupia, 2013). In fact, 
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scholars find that in public policy domains, scientists tend to present results with “incredible 
certitude,” shielding audiences from uncertainty in ways that they argue are detrimental for 
informed decision-making (Fischhoff, 2012; Manski, 2018).  
Disparate insights from work on the use of forensic evidence in criminal cases, weather 
forecasting, and climate change research (among many other disciplines) suggest that different 
ways of expressing uncertainty can lead to varied outcomes.  Crucially, the presenter of the 
information and the presentation format can have important effects. With respect to presentation 
formats, there is consistent evidence that numerical expressions of uncertainty (probabilities that 
specify both the location and degree of uncertainty with respect to some estimated reference 
point) are more reliably interpreted than linguistic expressions (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013; K. 
Martire et al., 2014; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). At the same time, there is evidence that people 
tend to be overconfident (e.g., ignoring confidence intervals and focusing on point estimates) 
even when calculated confidence intervals are provided (Correll & Gleicher, 2014; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Verbal expressions of uncertainty or “estimative language” (such as 
“unlikely”, “good chance”, and “probable”) are interpreted with more inter-subjective and cross-
context variation that sometimes leads to no significant effect at all (Fischhoff, 2012; Kadane & 
Koehler, 2018). However, Wallsten and Budescu (1995) emphasize that verbal expression may 
still be valuable, as they “…compensate by conveying greater nuances of meaning” (p.44). One 
can use rich language to convey the approximate location and degree of imprecision, but at the 
same time contextualize the uncertainty using “other aspects of the communicator's knowledge 
or opinions beyond degrees of uncertainty” (p.44). One study found that communicators of 
numeric uncertainty sometimes want to add additional qualification of uncertainty verbally to 
 
23 
serve as “cover” for themselves, especially when they may be responsible for outcomes or their 
reputations are at stake (Erev & Cohen, 1990).  
With respect to forensic evidence used in criminal trials, Martire et al. (2014) found when 
the underlying evidence was relatively in weak, verbal messages about uncertainty led decision-
makers to conclusions displaying “boomerang effects” or “weak evidence effects,” whereby they 
interpret the evidence as having the opposite valence from that intended by the statements 
(Martire et al., 2014). If the evidence was strong, they found presentation formats to matter less. 
In the context of weather forecasts, scholars have made great strides in advancing insights on 
how to express uncertainty in ways that are “effective” for decision-making. A study by Joslyn 
and LeClerc (2013) is especially useful. The authors found that people engaged more effectively 
with expressions of uncertainty when it is catered in two ways: 1) the uncertainty is directly 
related to the “decision task” in question, and 2) the framing of the message intercepts the 
tendency for people to choose a “preferred deterministic interpretation” when the cognitive load 
is too high (p.308). In related work, they found that the condition that effectively counters a 
“preferred deterministic interpretation” is one that explicitly blocks a common misinterpretation 
(in their case, this was achieved with statements such as “no rain”) (Joslyn et al., 2009). They 
conclude that by blocking the misinterpretation, effortful thinking is more easily activated, 
“allow[ing] for the more complex, probabilistic interpretation and the ensuing benefits to user 
decisions” (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013, p. 313).  
Beyond messages aiming for effective expression of uncertainty, scientific discourse is 
full of “hedges” – what Crismore and Kopple (1988) define as a linguistic element that signals 
tentativeness or caution while expressing information. Journalists, much like human rights 
practitioners, often consider including those hedges when reporting on scientific findings. Jensen 
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(2008) tested the effect of including hedging in science news and, found that hedges have little 
effect on what readers understand about the broader findings presented, but they do impact 
measures of trust in journalists and of scientists responsible for the research. This is consistent 
with the theoretical explanation of hedges, or caveats, serving as marks of source credibility.  
 
2.7 Open Questions  
In this dissertation, rather than approaching the problem of human rights statistics from 
the viewpoint of stark good/bad and use/misuse dichotomies, I recognize that numbers are 
powerful communication tools increasingly in demand in the human rights community. By 
distinguishing the subset of issues related to the inherent and unsolvable problem of data 
uncertainty, I seek to understand how human rights practitioners contend with it as they use 
numbers to inform and influence audiences. At present, we do not have a good sense of how 
human rights practitioners manage (or not) tensions with such data uncertainty. While there are 
calls for more transparency about the data generation processes and limitations as one way to 
contend with data uncertainty, this literature also makes clear there may be at least two potential 
tensions with this recommendation: 1) Numbers are powerful specifically for their simplified 
form that do not alert readers to messy, social, and subjective components of their production. 2) 
More broadly, when science is used in politicized contexts, methodological transparency is 
associated with reduced persuasiveness and political risk to the information provider. In this 
dissertation, I aim to understand how human rights practitioners perceive the strengths and risks 
that may come with being transparent about data they present to their audiences. Do calls for 
increased transparency have promise as an enhanced communication strategy for a community 
operating in politically complex contexts?  
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At the same time, the burgeoning literature advancing more productive engagement with 
uncertainty in other domains remains inconclusive about effective ways to convey uncertainty to 
information consumers. However, I draw on the scattered theoretical and empirical insights 
reviewed here to develop testable hypotheses about the impact of various ways of expressing 
data uncertainty. Through this study of data and uncertainty in the human rights context, I hope 
to not only make practical contributions to inform practitioners in this domain, but to contribute 




Chapter 3 Research Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction to Mixed Methods Design 
As stated above, this dissertation research sought to answer two overarching questions: 
1. How do human rights practitioners think about the value and impact of quantitative 
evidence and its associated uncertainty when communicating it to inform and 
influence audiences?  
2. When presented with quantitative evidence about violence, crime or abuse, how do 
different presentations of data uncertainty affect decision outcomes?  
 
To address these questions, I used a mixed methods approach. According to Creswell and 
Clark (2011), it is useful to employ mixed methods research to enhance the ability to answer 
multidimensional research questions and gain insights with one method where another method is 
relatively weak. In my study, I used the grounded theory qualitative research approach in parallel 
to conducting an online survey experiment (Charmaz, 2006). In general, the qualitative study 
aimed to answer the first question above, and the experiment was designed to answer the second 
question. While the two studies are distinct, they are complementary. The insights learned from 
each one benefited the other, as will become clear in Chapter 6 Discussion.  
 
The strength of the qualitative research is that based on the views, perceptions, and 
experiences of human rights advocates interviewed, I learned how their context and subjective 
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experiences shape their expectations and thinking about data, uncertainty, and their associated 
communication practices. The strength of an experiment is that by using randomization as an 
instrumental variable, one can isolate and identify the effect of a treatment on an outcome within 
a sample (List, Sadoff, & Wagner, 2011).  
 
The qualitative research informed the survey instrument design. While I drafted vignettes 
for the survey experiment a priori, I drew on insights with interviewees to improve and adjust the 
vignettes and interventions accordingly. For example, after hearing time and again from 
interviewees that they tend to scrutinize information and methodology more when the source of 
the information was less familiar to them, I modified the vignettes to ensure that the names of the 
information providers did not resemble any of the more familiar human rights organizations, 
hoping this would prompt people to pay more attention to the variables of interests in my study. 
Having these two complementary streams of insight enabled me to conduct what I believe to be a 
richer design, analysis, and interpretation of the science and politics of communicating human 
rights data.  
 
3.2 Qualitative Research  
To explore how human rights practitioners think about 1) quantification and data, and 2) 
the various dimensions related to communicating data uncertainty, I began this study with a 
qualitative grounded theory methodology. Grounded theory enables one to analyze empirical 
observations to help understand and explain a practice among a community of interest (Charmaz, 
2006). While the human rights literature offers evidence that data is influential and 
communication surrounding quantitative evidence of human rights violations is challenging, 
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little scholarship existed from within the community about how practitioners perceive and 
navigate these tensions in their daily work. Drawing on Creswell (2013), my qualitative research 
approach was to use semi-structured interviews to explore multiple dimensions and subjective 
experiences of participants in order gain evidence about their perspectives. I designed an 
interview protocol on the basis of my research question, which I piloted before beginning live 
interviews in Colombia and mostly remote video interviews for participants in the U.S. and 
Europe (see Appendix A). The semi-structured interviews began with general questions about 
the organizations work and their communication strategies about evidence and then moved to 
more specific questions about data production and consumption, quantitatively-inclined 
terminology, and how they see and communicate about data uncertainty.  
 
For the interviews I was able to conduct in person, I was able to observe participants on 
their own terms and in the contexts within which they usually operate. In reporting my findings, I 
aim to be transparent about my own biases and values as a researcher as well as those I detect of 
the participants. The themes I raise as my qualitative findings were derived during the course of 
the research and analysis rather than relying on rigid, predetermined definitions.  
 
3.2.1 Population of Study 
 
I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 28 human rights practitioners at 15 
human rights organizations who use data and statistics to advance their agendas. This is a very 
broad, diverse and encompassing group of actors that operate in transnational networks, from 
high-level international institutions working on a broad set of human rights issues, to very local 
grass roots organizations working in Colombia engaged in one issue of local importance. I 
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limited my study to individuals at organizations that produce public reports that include 
quantitative information. As such my sample may be biased toward members of relatively well-
resourced organizations, as they likely have the capacity to analyze and publish evidence-based 
claims to some degree.  
 
These interviewees were from 8 internationally-focused organizations, 2 U.S. focused 
organizations, and 7 Colombian organizations working to document, expose and advocate for an 
end to human rights violations. I recruited participants via snowball sampling, drawing on my 
professional connections to get early interviews and then asking those advocates for 
introductions to colleagues or to representatives in other organizations. Most of the international 
and U.S.-based interviews were conducted via video-conference, and all of the Colombian 
interviews were conducted in person. I agreed to anonymize individual interviewees. All 
interviewees are referred to with a label (C: Colombian, U: U.S.-based, G: Global) and a unique 
number from 1 through 28. 
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My sample from global organizations was skewed towards staff at Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
and Amnesty International (AI) in the U.S., arguably the two leading human rights organization 
with a global reach. Their work has influenced the shaping of the human rights movement 
globally (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Moyn, 2010). These two organizations are especially relevant 
for this study because they are large organizations, with many thematic and geographic divisions 
that do research, conduct advocacy, participate in elite domestic and international policy and 
diplomatic forums, write public appeals, publish reports for general consumption, and submit 
evidence to international criminal courts, among other things. Their reports are also coded by 
peace and conflict scholars and used for academic analyses of patterns of human rights abuses 
and human rights reporting patterns (e.g. the Political Terror Scale and Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program) (Gleditsch, Metternich, & Ruggeri, 2014).  
 
It is useful to note that a single organization can have multiple roles with respect to data 
and analysis. Some organizations, especially those focused on a single country or issue (e.g., 
Colombia and U.S. focused organizations within this study), have dedicated staff conducting 
ongoing monitoring and documentation of HRVs for the purpose of counting. In these cases, 
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staff members often review unstructured information from multiple sources (e.g., testimonies, 
press accounts, documents), contend with their particularities and contradictions, develop 
definitions and classification rules to structure and code relevant pieces of information and to 
handle conflicting information, and then digitally organize their data, usually in spreadsheets and 
sometimes in more complex databases. All of the Colombian groups in this study are data 
producers to varying degrees, collecting data on specific types of violations or crimes (e.g., 
killings of community leaders, forced disappearances, sexual violence). Among the U.S. and 
globally-focused groups, three of the organizations work on specific human rights issues (hate 
crimes, human trafficking, and banning of landmines). At the same time, almost all the 
organizations also reuse data (either open source data or data shared from partners) or they cite 
existing numbers produced by other organizations.  
 
With respect to statistical data analysis, most interviewees consider themselves and their 
organization non-experts. One group has recently invested heavily in quantitative expertise, 
bringing in a full-time statistician to run an ongoing global survey. Several groups have a small 
minority of in-house methodologists or have contracted with short-term statistical consultants for 
isolated studies using advanced statistical methods. Only one organization focuses exclusively on 
conducting advanced statistical analysis. Despite varying levels of quantitative expertise, all 
organizations represented in this study present quantitative claims in one way or another in their 
human rights work. 
 
My sample of respondents is limited and may be biased. It is a convenience sample 
originating from my own professional network and extending into branches of my network’s 
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network. To try to capture some diverse perspectives, I recruited and interviewed advocates from 
international, U.S.-focused, and Colombian based organizations. While my own qualitative 
findings may not be representative of the “human rights community” as a whole, in Chapter 4 I 
nevertheless draw out the most consistent themes expressed by interviewees to argue what I 
perceive to be some latent norms governing the use of uncertain data and numbers, at least 
among this small, yet diverse group. 
 
By including globally-focused groups, U.S.-focused groups and Colombia-based groups, 
I aimed to cover different perspectives. Global and U.S. groups cover a wider breadth of 
international issues, and Colombian groups are mostly focused on domestic human rights, 
political violence and transitional justice related issues (Tate, 2007). All of the groups operate 
under the same international human rights framework, sharing some communication strategies 
and data use practices, but working in different contexts, with different level of resources, and 




I received consent to record all interviews. I then transcribed then, coded them using N-
Vivo software, and analyzed them inductively to detect prominent themes across the set. A 
research assistant and I first read half of the interviews with the sole purpose of building the 
codebook. I identified naturally occurring ideas in the interviews, clustering them by common 
themes, and repeating the process until meaningful themes emerged for interpretation (Charmaz, 
2006; Creswell, 2013). I then both re-read all English interviews and applied the codes 
systematically. I then coded all the Spanish interviews with the same codebook. All interviewee 
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quotes are kept anonymous in the findings presented in Chapter 4: Qualitative Interview 
Findings. 
 
3.3 Pilot Study of Sample of Human Rights Watch Reports 
To complement the perspectives gathered through interviews, I also conducted a small 
pilot study of Human Rights Watch publications to see if I could gauge the extent to which they 
present statistics in their report, their inclusion of methodological detail and the language they 
use to convey any limitations to numeric claims. I selected HRW publications because HRW is 
arguably the leading human rights organization in the world, and because the interview study 
also included a greater perspective from HRW staff than any other organization, so it made sense 
to compare with their reports. HRW reports are also a key publication included in many 
quantitative indicators about HRVs in the world (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010; Fariss, 2014). 
After compiling a complete list of all HRW reports from 2012 and from 2018, my research 
assistant and I selected a simple random sample of six reports from each of the two years 
included. I selected these two years somewhat arbitrarily, based on one interviewee informing 
me that sometime in the mid 2010s HRW enhanced their focus on methodology sections. We 
coded the reports for five main variables: presence of quantitative claims about human rights 
violations, the purpose the quantitative claims was serving in the report; presence of data 
limitations about quantitative claims; the type of limitations message; where in the report the 
data limitations message was included (e.g., alongside the quantitative claim, in a methods 




3.4 Survey Experiment 
3.4.1 Experimental Design 
 
I designed the survey experiment to answer the following primary research question:  
 
RQ: When presented with quantitative evidence about violence, crime or abuse, how do 
different ways of conveying data uncertainty affect decision outcomes?  
 
Using an experimental design allowed me to examine the causal effects of different 
presentation messages and formats of communicating data uncertainty on individual data-
informed decisions related to human rights, while controlling for potentially confounding 
variables.  
I developed theoretically-informed hypotheses and treatments (presented below) on the 
basis of literature reviewed in Chapter 2: Literature and Theoretical Framework. To test my 
hypotheses, I carried out a between-subject experiment with 6 experimental conditions (2 
controls and 4 treatments) which I tested across three different vignettes (6 x 3 design). I 




The language used for each treatment assumed to draw on the data presenters knowledge 
of how the data is uncertain – in these cases that numbers have high uncertainty and 
disproportionate selection bias in one group – and tests the effect of making the data uncertainty 
explicit to decision-makers in various ways, the goal here being to help decision-makers avoid 
interpreting the numerical information with false precision. For example, in one of the vignettes 
designed for the study – a hypothetical vignette involving rape survivors – the data producers 
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know, on the basis of working in the local context, that underreporting is probably much more 
severe in one region (Choco) than in another (displaced persons camp in Sucre). The treatment 
messages draw on the data provider’s insight about the provenance of the data and convey the 
data’s likely limitations. In this case, an “effective” adjustment would be to allocate a relatively 
higher proportion of the available resources to Choco to account for the possibility that in Choco, 
there may be considerably more victims that could require services than those suggested by the 
reported number of victims (as compared to the control condition when raw numbers and no 
uncertainty are provided).  
 
Each participant was randomly assigned to an experimental group (among four 
treatments and two controls). Respondents then received the same treatment for three vignettes, 
which they viewed in random order. For each vignette, after asking respondents to make a 
specific decision (all on continuous scales), respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in 
the institution providing the information on a Likert scale. In addition to these main outcome 
measures, I also collected data on respondents’ confidence in their decision and their self-
assessed level of familiarity, and expertise on the specific issues covered in the given scenario. 
After viewing the three vignettes and related questions, the survey concluded with questions 
about respondents’ political views, math education, quantitative literacy, cognitive reflection, 
and personal demographics, all to serve as controls in the analysis.  
 
Each participant was randomly assigned to an experimental group (among four 
treatments and two controls). Respondents then received the same treatment for three vignettes, 
which they viewed in random order. For each vignette, after asking respondents to make a 
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specific decision (all on continuous scales), respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in 
the institution providing the information on a Likert scale. In addition to these main outcome 
measures, I also collected data on respondents’ confidence in their decision and their self-
assessed level of familiarity and expertise on the specific issues covered in the given scenario. 
After viewing the three vignettes and related questions, the survey concluded with questions 
about respondents’ political views, math education, quantitative literacy, cognitive reflection, 
and personal demographics, all to serve as controls in the analysis. Before launching my full 
study, I conducted a pilot study to test for any unforeseen issues with my instructions, 
instruments, data collection software, and to get a better sense of the time it would take 
respondents to complete the full survey.  
 
3.4.3 Vignettes  
 
I included three vignettes (as opposed to one) to control for any vignette-specific effects. Lab 
findings are more robust if treatment effects hold across the three decision-making scenarios. 
Across vignettes, I assume that information providers are local experts, thus in the position to 
know that the available numbers they present are partial and biased due to limitations in 
reporting and observability. Each vignette was designed to do the following: 1) present a 
scenario that reflected, as closely as possible, a real world human rights situation and realistic 
decision context; 2) use data about violence or crime collected for some other original purpose 
and reuse it in scenarios requiring a decision; 3) require the decision-maker to put themselves in 
the shoes of a professional decision-maker; 4) make a resource allocation (in two vignettes) or 
criminal sentencing decision (in one vignette) where the numeric information could have a 
consequential anchoring effect. Overall, the scenarios were such that misinterpreting the numeric 
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data provided, for example by seeing a trend where one may not actually exist or drawing a 
seeming clear but incorrect conclusion, could be problematic. I wrote the vignettes to try to make 
the information and uncertainty messages the resounding signal, minimizing other signals people 
often heuristically use in decision-making with statistics and uncertainty. For example, name 
recognition and professionalism are often used as heuristics for judging the value and credibility 
of claims (which advocates discuss as a kind of heuristic in the interview study). To try to 
weaken the potential role this might play, even in fictional scenarios, I tried to avoid an 
institutional name that might sound overly professional. I aimed to take an objective and 
measured tone, using informational framing, and avoiding emotional or motivational framings, 
so as not to introduce confounds from other messaging appeals (McEntire, Leiby, & Krain, 
2015a). For example, I did not include images and colors, as they have been shown to affect how 
individuals respond to materials, and in particular, to potentially elicit different emotional 






Table 2: Overview of Vignettes 
Vignette 
Issue 
Vignette format Numeric 
Information 
Decision task  Related 
Literature 







asking for input 
on how to 
allocate limited 
health resources 



















portion of 700 
available 





















Assistant to the 
Office of the 
Prosecutor at a 
Special War 
Crimes Court 
must advise on 
how to prioritize 
allocating limited 
investigative 
resources to cases 
along ethnic 
lines.  
Number of known 
civilian casualties 
by ethnic group, 



























length for a man 
convicted of a 
felony based on 
summary of the 
case.  
Recidivism risk 
score based on 
available crime 

























Each vignette presents a scenario that reflects, as closely as possible, real world human 
rights situations and realistic decision contexts. Vignette 1 presents convenience data about 
known cases of sexual violence. Reporting about sexual violence, and in particularly wartime 
sexual violence, is notoriously incomplete (Cohen & Green, 2012; Leiby, 2012; Merry, 2016; 
Roth et al., 2011). Preventing and supporting victims of sexual violence is also a priority issue 
for many human right grant-making organizations. Thus, Vignette 1 presents a typical scenario 
where grant-makers must allocate resources among two contexts with highly uncertain 
information. Vignette 2 is inspired by political science professor Luc Reydam’s 2016 study on 
the influence of an NGO on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He argues 
that the selection bias in a large body of evidence presented by an NGO in the early days of the 
ICTR may have led to bias in the prosecutorial strategy, which he argues in the long-term may be 
part of the explanation for the ongoing impunity against the Tutsi perpetrators of violence during 
the 1994 Rwandan ethnic conflict. Thus, Vignette 2 creates a fictitious, but hopefully believable 
situation where criminal court investigators must allocate prosecutorial resources on the basis of 
partial collections of evidence. Given that Starr (2014) found evidence that actuarial risk scores 
had a significant impact on sentencing outcomes among law student decision-makers, and given 
that she interprets the veneer of objectivity as likely influencing this effect, I have included here 
a version of the evidence-based sentencing (EBS) scenario she designed as Vignette 3 to see if 
adding data uncertainty interventions create any attenuating effects on her observed effects. The 
use of risks scores and other predictive measures in the criminal justice system are increasingly 






I designed four uncertainty message types (treatments), drawing on theoretical insights 
from the science communication and practical insights from human rights scholarship and 
practice.  
T1 – Simple Caveat 
Recall that theoretically, caveats signal caution while expressing information and are 
often symbolic over substantive (Crismore & Kopple, 1988). In studies about the presentation of 
science in the media, caveats have been found to signal credibility if communicated by authors of 
claims (Jensen, 2008) or to have no detrimental effect on perceptions of source trust (Retzbach & 
Maier, 2015). In human rights reports, practitioners either use simple caveats to communicate 
research limitations or “approximate” language to warn of potential under-reporting 
(Satterthwaite and Simone 2016; Heinzelman & Meier, 2013). I tested the impact of this message 
type, collecting information both on decision outcomes as well as perceptions of trust of the 
information provider.  
 
T2 – Rich Background 
One of goals of transparently communicating data limitations is to put on record much 
more information about earlier stages in the knowledge production process. Responsible data 
scholars are recommending that when data is used to make claims about magnitude, patterns, and 
related claims, human rights communicators should also provide information about what is 
known and knowable – i.e., the data generating process – and disclose the known data flaws 
more precisely and fully than what is done in the typical caveat. At the very least, such 




However, the literature on communicating uncertainty finds outcomes in the presence of 
long and non-numerical disclosure of data provenance as potentially unfavorable. More 
description about data provenance could be interpreted with great variation by audiences, it could 
generate cognitive overload (Kahneman, 2011), or it could be ignored altogether (Lupia, 2013). 
The effect on decisions or source credibility of providing more information about data 
provenance remains unclear, with conflicting claims in the literature. I tested language that goes 
beyond the caveat, adding precision and detail about the data production and limitations for all 
data presented.  
 
T3 –Expert Interception 
One of the most useful insights about communicating uncertainty came from Joslyn & 
LeClerc (2013) that found people significantly improved their cognitive engagement with 
uncertainty information, and made more cautious decisions, once a “preferred deterministic 
decision” was intercepted with language directed at the decision task. In human rights domains, 
scholars’ greatest concern about the use of uncertain numbers is that audiences receiving the 
information will confuse data patterns as real-world patterns and that such erroneous inference 
and interpretation will lead to bad outcomes (although what constitutes good and bad outcomes 
is decision-specific and context-dependent). The question remains: if we think such 
misinterpretation is problematic, and we think that more effortful thinking about data uncertainty 
is beneficial, what would be the impact of directly foreseeing and intercepting this erroneous 
interpretation? Would doing so lead decision-makers to alter their decisions? I designed and 
tested language conceptually guided by Joslyn & LeClerc’s insight, explicitly drawing on the 
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expertise of the communicators to warn about the potential bias in data and the impact of that 
bias on the decision task.  
 
T4 - Numerical Expression of Uncertainty – Confidence Intervals 
As seen above, numeric expressions of uncertainty are often more reliably interpreted 
than linguistic expressions, as they more precisely express the direction and degree of 
uncertainty. At the same time, we know that confidence intervals are often ignored (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). I included a treatment where uncertainty is expressed as a numeric range to 
indicate the skewed direction and degree of uncertain numbers. The treatment aims to 
numerically express what is verbally expressed to varying degrees in other treatments – the 
sizable selection bias in data underlying numeric claims. While these may be more reliably 
interpreted, we do not know the effect on decision-making in their presence, especially because 
there could be the confounding effect of heuristic reasoning with statistics.  
If we find that numerical expressions improve decisions reliably, it could be a case for 
further investment in statistical methodologies for these applications and for producing formal 
estimates in more human rights projects. On the contrary, if the outcomes with this treatment are 
equal or relatively less reliable than verbal forms, it could guide advocates to concentrate on 




I included two control conditions: 
C0 - No numbers  
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A pure control condition, with no numbers included to influence the decision-maker. This 
condition was included as a way to gauge the population “prior” – how do people make decisions 
in the absence of numbers. 
 
C1 – Numbers, No Uncertainty 
A modified control, numbers presented as objective and hard evidence of the magnitude 
and patterns of crime or victims of violence. The idea here is that numbers may be seen as hard 
evidence, with the veneer of precision and objectivity intact. 
On the basis of the theoretical insights reviewed above, I propose the following 
hypotheses about the impact these treatments on two primary dependent variables: decisions and 
trust perceptions of the information provider:  
 
• H1: Quantitative information presented with its full veneer of authority and 
objectivity – and with no accompanying information to disclose data uncertainty – 
will shift the mean of decision outcomes relative to when no quantitative 
information is presented at all (C0 is different from C1.) 
• H2: Simple Caveat – being short statements signaling tentativeness or caution 
with data – will have no effect on decision means relative to presenting 
information with its full veneer of precision and objectivity. This would suggest 
evidence of the “caveat fallacy.” (C1 is equal to T1) 
• H3: Expert interception on anchoring effect in reported data (T3) will lead to 
shifts in decisions relative to simply providing audiences with more information 
about the data generation process (T2).  
• H4: Given that uncertainty statements are ascribed to the information provider, 
trust in the information providers will benefit from disclosing data uncertainty 
(i.e. there will be higher levels of trust in the information providers when some 





Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses. 














I do not feel the current state of theory enables one to make strong hypotheses on the 
effects of other treatments. For this reason, beyond testing these hypotheses, the study will also 
enable exploratory observations to guide future research.  
 
The post-vignette survey questions will include questions on participants demographics 
(i.e. age, gender), level of math education, political orientation (based on political typology 
questions) and cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005). 
 
Treatment Type Characteristics Main Decision 
Hypotheses 
C0 No Numbers Minimal information  





C1 ≠ C0 
 
T1 Number + Simple 
Caveat 
Language, short warning 
that uncertainty exists 
 
T1 = C1 
 
T2 Number + Rich 
Background 
Language, long description 
describing possible sources 
of uncertainty stemming 




T3 Number + Expert 
Interception 
Language, long description 
warning of uncertainty and 
corrective decision-specific 
suggestion 
T3 > C1 
 
T4 Number + Numeric 
Confidence 
Interval 
Numeric, short description 






3.4.6 Example Vignette and Treatment Language 
 
I include here the full implementation of one vignette to guide reader as they consider the 
design and view the results. The other vignettes and the specific language used for the controls 
and treatments are included in Appendix B. 
 
Vignette 1: “Health Kits” for Wartime Sexual Violence 
Stop the Violence Now (SVN) is a non-profit agency dedicated to promoting human rights 
globally. We are headquartered in New York, but collaborate with local authorities around the world to 
eradicate violence and its effects.           
 
We are concerned about the long-term health of rape survivors. Studies show that survivors of 
sexual violence are more likely to experience mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, substance 
abuse, and post-traumatic stress disorder. They also have higher rates of illnesses like cancer, cardio-
vascular disease, and diabetes over their lifetimes.  
  
We have decided to provide post-rape care resources to victims of sexual violence in war-torn countries. 
These come in the form of “kits” – which include a bundle of professional services promoting physical 
and mental health, and social services.  
  
We will begin our provision of these kits in Colombia. This year, SVN’s offices documented increasing 
numbers of sexual violence in two distinct locations in the country. One is the large and remote Pacific 
region of Choco where there is still an armed conflict. The other is a displaced persons camp in the 
northern region of Sucre. We will distribute emergency health kits in these two regions.       
 
[* C1+ Treatment ] 
 
We aim to distribute our limited services to benefit as many victims of sexual violence as possible 
who arrive at the locations where we offer services. Often, we find that more people show up for services 
than official counts have tallied. 
  
We currently have the resources to fund 700 kits. We are seeking input on how to best distribute them.   
 
Based on the information provided here, please tell us how many of the 700 kits you would 







Treatment Name Uncertainty message [*] 
C0 No numbers [No C1 paragraph above] 
 
C1 Number, NO 
uncertainty 
In Choco we have 200 documented cases of sexual violence 
and in the Sucre displaced persons camp we have 400 
documented cases. 
C1+ T1 Simple Caveat Be aware that reporting sexual violence is culturally 
stigmatized in Colombia. Many people may choose not to 
report their experiences for fear of social consequences. 
C1+ T2 Rich 
Background  
In both regions of Colombia, people may avoid reporting 
sexual violence due to cultural stigma.       
 
In Choco, local government-run health clinics are doing their 
best to report known cases, yet there are very few of these 
clinics across the large region. More generally, data collection 
is challenging in a context where illegal armed groups 
continue to operate and use sexual violence as one way to 
repress the population.       
 
In Sucre, all the reported cases are from a relatively small 
displaced persons camp. There are several health clinics 
throughout the camp where people can get aid, and local 
officials make an effort to document all the sexual violence 
cases they learn about.                       
C1+ T3 Expert 
Interception 
Be aware that the reported cases of sexual violence are an 
undercount, and likely do not represent the total number nor 
the pattern of all sexual violence cases in both locations. 
While we cannot be sure, we may know about many more of 
the victims of sexual violence in the Sucre camp than we do 
about all victims in Choco.                        
      
In Choco, there are probably many more victims of sexual 
violence than are reported because the region is so large, 
precarious, and still has active armed groups. In Sucre, there 
may also be more victims than the reported number, yet the 
displaced persons camp is smaller, has administrators working 
around the clock, and is not located in an active conflict zone. 




[C1 embedded] In Choco we have 200 documented 
cases of sexual violence, but the total number could range to 
be anywhere between these 200 to 2,000 cases. In the Sucre 
displaced persons camp we have 400 documented cases, but 
the number of people who have suffered some form of sexual 





3.4.7 Subject Pool and Sample Size  
 
As mentioned above, I recruited 970 college graduates via MTurk based on a 
conservative target sample size of 1,000. A priori, I calculated that I would need at minimum a 
sample size of 678 to achieve 80% power based on an assumed effect size of f=0.15 (computed 
using g*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007)). To determine the assumed effect size, 
I drew on values reported in Starr (2014), who ran a lab experiment with a similar structure in 
the context of criminal sentencing with risk scores. The study reports an 0.8 year increase in 
sentencing length in the high risk + risk-score condition (p. 869). I calculated the initial effect 
size assuming my control group would have the expected mean in Starr’s high risk + risk score 
condition (5 +.8 years). I then made the remaining assumptions relative to the 5.8 years in the 
control condition.  These assumptions were highly conservative given that in some conditions, 
the literature reviewed did not given me a strong basis to develop clear hypotheses. Then, I 
calculated an SD α of 2.14 years by calculating Starr’s residual standard deviation based on her 
reported standard errors. For my calculations, I assumed equal residual variance across my 
treatment groups. I included a Bonferroni correction to account for analysis of two dependent 
variables, yielding a significance level of .025 based on a target family-wise error rate of 5%.   
 
Studies have repeatedly shown that MTurk generates reliable, high-quality data for 
experimental social science research (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Mturkers were eligible to respond to this 
the survey if they met the following conditions: they were based in the U.S., had at least a 
college degree, and had a successful track record of completing tasks on MTurk (over 1,000 
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tasks previously completed with a 95% approval rate). On MTurk, the job ad avoided mentioning 
human rights, politics, or any of the issues covered in the vignettes. It simply asked participants 
to provide their best judgment in relation to the scenarios. Respondents were paid $1.50 for 
responding to the full survey, calibrating to other vignette-based work on MTurk (Berinsky et al., 
2012; McEntire, Leiby, & Krain, 2015b; Paolacci et al., 2010). Buhrmester et al. (2011) found 
compensation to only affect the number of participants who complete the survey, not the quality 
of their responses.  
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Chapter 4 Qualitative Interview Findings 
In 2013, Colombia’s National Center for Historical Memory (CNMH) released its 
flagship report, Basta Ya! Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity (2013), recounting over 50 
years of violence in the country’s armed conflict.1 One of the report’s most visible and 
memorable findings was that at least 220,000 people died as a result of the decades-long 
Colombian conflict. In addition, its leading chapter reports many other prominent statistics, 
including the proportional responsibility of conflict perpetrators for massacres, trends in forced 
disappearances, kidnappings, sexual violence, and forced recruitment across 30+ years. The 
report has been heralded by the press, civil society, and even critics as being an extremely 
valuable contribution to historical reckoning.  
 
When I spoke with one of the report’s main authors in November of 2017, he confessed 
that the 220,000 figure and the report’s overall reception far-exceeded his expectations in press 
coverage, impact with the government, and favorable public reception.2 At the time of 
publication, he worried about what he felt were severe limitations in the data underlying the 
reported statistics. CNMH has had to collate cases from many different sources with varying data 
quality and opacity in the underlying records, making the merging of duplicate reports difficult. 
Some of the available streams of data, he suspected, likely had biases in their reporting practices. 
Documentation of some types of violence were only recently becoming possible, such as 
                                               
1 “Basta Ya! translates to “Enough Already!.” 
2 Participant C8.  
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evidence of paramilitary crimes.3 “When we launched the figure we had great fears, because 
there were methodological gaps that could be used to undermine us.” Yet, he felt real pressure to 
include statistics: “we could not come out with such a report without putting on the public stage 
the issue of the sheer dimensions [of the violence],” which the numbers helped portray.4 To 
manage the tension, the team decided to lead with the 220,000 figure which they felt was a 
lower-bound based on their data cleaning of reported killings across multiple sources, but they 
also warned readers “not to confuse data with facts.”5 The first section of the volume elaborates 
on the difficulty of documenting and measuring the experience of violence. Accompanying the 
report was also a three-minute video describing some of the limitations of the CNMH’s violence 
databases.6  
 
While CNMH staff braced themselves for critique, criticism of the limitations of the 
statistics never came. “We presented them, but the impact of the 220,000 was so strong, for 
example, in the media, that no one asked about the rigor used to construct that statistic or how we 
arrived at it.” There was little appetite for nuance by the media, which he believes is because 
“the magnitude of the figure was so impactful on the public stage,” but also because of the level 
of trust the institution had established within Colombian society. “When one builds a 
reputation…society doesn’t ask much about the route….depending on the audience, what matters 
                                               
3 In 2003-2006, the largest paramilitary organization demobilized and agreed to confess crimes to be eligible for reduced 
penalties.  
4 In fact, he says, the CNMH had shied away from publishing statistics in earlier reports. The CNMH’s experience reporting the 
phenomenon of forced disappearances is telling. Due to the difficulty of comprehensively documenting this type of violence, the 
CNMH’s first report on forced disappearances had opted for not leading with statistics. It instead had a whole chapter talking 
about the limitations of knowing about forced disappearances, given that perpetrators intention to erase the person, the event, and 
the possibility of knowing altogether (CNMH 2014). Yet, they were surprised by a strong call for a magnitude estimate, thus the 
CNMH wrote a second report, in which they report 60,630 victims between 1970 and 2015 (CNMH 2016). 
5 He also shared how they considered yet discarded the option of calculating statistical inferences rather than reporting numbers 
based solely on documented cases, but he says he was advised against it. International advisors stressed that numbers needed to 
be based on names, as statistical estimates in other countries’ had been perceived as elusive, with a public that was not 





is the figure and the producer.”7 The organization did not even get pushback from political actors 
potentially threatened by the claims. He was most surprised that some sophisticated academic 
peers and methodologists, people he felt would have clearly seen the deficiencies in the data and 
analysis, did not publicly raise concerns.  
 
A few days after my interview with him, I spoke with one of the academics that the 
CNMH’s representative viewed as a potential leading critic. I asked this scholar about the 
report’s statistics. Without hesitation, he described them as “dreadful,” but then, he went on to 
consider the overall value of the report nonetheless:  
 
“it’s a report that talks about the horrors of the war, that says that the state was 
complicit but at the same time doesn’t side with the guerrillas, that in the Colombian 
context is something new…it obliged [President] Santos to apologize to the country, so 
it’s a report that caused such political sympathy for reasons that are so good, that one 
does not want to get in the way of that…”8  
 
Overall, his assessment was that it was unwise to quibble over the data and methods in 
the face of such an important success for historical reckoning in the country.  He explained his 
reasoning:  
 
“So there is a criteria that is academic and one that is political, so with[in] which school 
of thought shall I stay? So let’s say that I try to stay within a bound that is tolerably bad…Is it 
worth removing [the statistic] or not? I’m not too sure, this is probably an ambiguous response.”9  
 
This exchange captures much of the tension the human rights advocates I interviewed 
deal with as they make quantitative claims on the basis of uncertain data, both in Colombia and 
beyond. They struggle with a tension between the demand and supply of data, and the politics 
                                               
7 Consistent with the idea of strong trust in sources perceived as experts (Lupia 2013; Andreas and Greenhill 2010).  
8 Participant C7  
9 Participant C7 
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and practicalities of evidence-based claims-making in favor of human rights advocacy. The 
numbers, even when uncertain, can be of great value when they generate a social and political 
response, but they must steer clear of “bad statistics.” In this chapter, I analyze and find a 
relatively consistent and stable set of themes which I will argue constitute informal norms 
regulating “good enough” numbers for human rights advocacy: imperfect, temporary, 
conservative and empirical, i.e., they are based on available data rather than unfounded guesses. 
“Good enough” numbers are not intended to be precise – and may indeed be far off from 
representative claims – but by and large, both producers and their audiences find them acceptable 
for the primary goal of garnering attention to human rights violations. The role of transparent 
communication of data production and data uncertainty has an ambiguous role in this tenuous 
formula. One the one hand, transparency is seen as a generically good, responsible practice by 
most respondents in this study, yet many emphasize that audiences have little interest in it unless 
the numbers are glaringly questionable or if the source provider is weak.10 
 
While the CNMH researcher remains self-critical and self-conscious of the reported 
figures, he finds solace in the fact that historical clarification and memory work continue – 
emphasizing a temporary quality to the numbers in the CNMH’s reports. Among their ongoing 
efforts, they established more permanent monitoring through their violence “observatory” so that 
they could take more direct responsibility over data collection going forward. They found that 
since Enough Already! was published, many more people contacted the CNMH to offer new 
testimonies. By the time we spoke in 2017, the number of documented conflict-related deaths 
                                               




had grown to 275,000. The original report, he told me, was never meant to be the final word on 
conflict-related statistics. The construction of historical memory is participatory and ongoing.  
 
Drawing on interviews with staff from leading human rights organizations in Colombia, 
in the U.S., and at the international level, this chapter offers the perspectives of human rights 
advocates: how they 1) view their work producing and citing quantitative data and statistics 
about human rights abuses and 2) perceive their communication strategies about numbers and 
data limitations to their respective audiences. As the exchange about the CNMH’s war-related 
death statistic highlights, most of the study participants use the rhetorical power of numbers to 
advance their advocacy goals. These perspectives are additionally valuable because they offer 
insight into how advocates intend for numbers to be read. Having this viewpoint allows us to 
later compare the intentions of human rights advocates with the experimental trial that, in part, 
offers insight into how numbers are actually comprehended and used by laypersons as input to 
decision-making.  
 
Satterthwaite and Simone (2016) encourage a move away from contrasting human rights 
research with social scientific standards, to a study on existing and possibly shared “norms and 
principles” regarding the use of quantification in human rights advocacy. In this vein, one of the 
contributions of this chapter is to present what advocates (in this study) quite consistently voice 
as their notions of “good enough” numbers for advocacy. I analyze what appears to be the 
guiding and constraining principles of “good enough” numbers, how interviewees determine 
what counts in this category, and why such numbers appear to be generally accepted in the 
human rights community without rebuke. While “transparency” is often stated to be a core 
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ingredient of “good enough” numbers, in practice, advocates say they do relatively little, often 
less than they would like, to convey the methodological detail, information about the data 
production process, or any limitations they know to inherently affect their quantitative claims. 
Ultimately, conveying data uncertainty is secondary to more pragmatic choices advocates make 
as they use quantitative information to advance their advocacy goals.  
 
4.1 Advocates emphasize value of numbers in advocacy 
Human rights advocacy is essentially a persuasive endeavor. All 28 human rights 
advocates interviewed for this study – whether working on hate crime issue, sexual violence, 
lethal violence, or any other human rights violations, whether in Colombia or elsewhere – 
confirm that quantitative, data-based claims are highly valuable to compel favorable attention to 
their causes among multiple audiences (confirming what other human rights scholars have 
noted). Primary audiences for numbers are journalists (and “the media”), policymakers, and the 
general public. Based on my interviews, numbers serve the advocacy agenda in three main ways: 
1) numbers communicate crisis and thus compel highly-desired attention; 2) simple descriptive 
analyses of data bolster primarily qualitative claims; and 3) to a much more limited degree, 
advanced statistical analysis can bring scientific “cover” in complex politicized contexts. Despite 
the three implying different degrees of quantitative expertise and statistical complexity, 
interviewees stress that all three are inherently used for their rhetorical value. For this reason, 
many interviewees describe recent shifts to incorporate more data and statistics into their work.  
 




In my interviews, I find that by far, the main way advocates view the power of numbers 
is in relation to the media. However, they describe the numbers serving less as precise counts and 
more as triggers to draw much needed initial attention to issues. I emphasize initial because 
numbers, and press attention more generally, are meant to be snapshots, with little concern or 
consequence if they become outdated quickly. In the words of one researcher, “The value is in 
that everybody wants to know [a number]... It attracts attention. It attracts media attention, 
it...can be really effective and have expedience.”11 Another high-level advocate echoes the 
sentiment, “…having been a journalist before, I remember how important it is to put numbers on 
a certain crisis.”12 At a basic level, by providing a number about the magnitude of a crisis, they 
not only trying to heighten attention to an issue, they also believe they are answering what 
audiences have come to expect in order to remain engaged. In this way, numbers may serve as 
effective stimuli to capture information consumers’ very limited capacity to pay attention to new 
information (Lupia, 2013).  
 
All interviewees suggest, in one way or another, that while numbers are quantitative 
units, they actually used to communicate a qualitative message about whether the issue in 
question is devastating enough to deserve limited attention in a saturated attention economy. “It's 
more about the ‘what's happening’ rather than the ‘how much,’” said another participant.13 So, 
while it is a specific number that is provided, the message meant to be unambiguously heard by 
audiences is ‘it’s a lot.’ Another participant put it this way: “It flags for people the extent, and 
maybe the urgency of, a problem, like attacks on human rights defenders around the world.”14 
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14 Participant G10 
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One interviewee in Colombia emphasized, “in fact, if you do not use that language, seldom 
would you make the headlines, I would think, because it becomes a situation that automatically 
turns on an alarm…don’t put adjectives…put the statistic.”15 Several participants believe that 
numbers make issues memorable, and that is required for sustaining their audiences attention. 
For C1, numbers “stay in your memory and they create public opinion and media pressure for an 
issue.”16  
 
Monitoring groups, i.e., groups collecting data about a given phenomenon in an ongoing 
way, feel that producing data and updated counts has enabled them to make abuses socially and 
politically legible over time. For example, one U.S. interviewee said, “I can also tell you 
anecdotally we get tons of press hits off of the hate [group] list. It's the reason it's kind of the 
biggest thing in our marketing and publications… It's much easier to place a story that way than 
it is to saying hey, hate groups are a problem, that's a weaker claim or a weaker position to 
advocate from than the numbers.” Similarly in Colombia, several groups described numbers as a 
way to ensure journalists maintain attention on an issue over time, because they can provide 
numerical updates, what one interviewee called a “media coup.”17 18 
 
Beyond the media, participants talked about the value of numbers with policymakers in a 
similar way, to convey ‘it’s a lot.’ In the words of a high-level advocate, “if we are able to tell 
you that over 6,000 people have been killed in the Philippines as a result of the drug war being 
waged by the president, that counts with decision makers. Of course, they always want to know 
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17 Participant C2 
18 Participant C1 
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the stats.”19  Numbers serve “just to impress upon policy makers that this was not a marginal or 
small issue.”20 To these audiences, conveying numbers is not only meant to make issues visible, 
but to discourage issues from being “downplayed”21 or considered “isolated cases.”22  Another 
interviewee described the pressure she feels from policymakers to put a number on problems that 
are hard to quantify. “We know the problem is big enough to do something about, and on the 
advocacy side, we [get asked] those questions all the time... We started saying up front, we don't 
have the data,…but yeah, I mean, it would be really helpful to have those bigger numbers.”23  
 
This practice of reporting numbers over time did invite a few lines of cautious critique. 
One advocate said the allure of the number is sometimes too good: “The plus side is that the 
number helped us convey the severity of [the problem]. The downside is that the number has 
now lived in infamy and people continue to cite the 300,000 figure even though it's 20 years old 
and is no longer anywhere near accurate. It's like once you put a number out into the universe, 
it's very hard to get people to shift.”24 While anchoring is a core behavioral heuristic (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974), here we can appreciate their staying power decades passed a number’s 
original moment of use. This power – and danger – is exacerbated by the facility with which 
numbers are moved from their original context of production – “mutant statistics,” as Best 
(2012) calls them. Another concern is the age-old body counts problem, where a metric becomes 
a target in its own right. There is prominent, yet subdued concern that the allure of numbers in 
the press especially creates incentives to always want to show things as getting worse. It also 
leads to creative arithmetic calculations to make the available data more dramatic, like choosing 
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to report incidents in a more dramatic unit of analysis, such as “every 29 minutes, a Colombian 
becomes a victim of sexual violence.”25  
 
In this way, advocates (especially in Colombia) recognize that numbers used in this way 
are “superficial …very rhetorical, and one sees that the data do not really serve to describe 
problems or make decisions.”26 We know from Porter (1995) that the force of numbers in public 
life is that their consumers mechanically accept them as objective, authoritative information 
sources, especially in contexts where there is relatively weak subjective authority. What we see 
here, however, is that their use, while guided by some conscientious parameters (as will become 
more clear below) is not aligned with how audiences tend to understand numbers (as objective 
and powerful anchoring informational inputs.). We begin to see the mismatch between human 
rights advocates’ performative use of numbers within a broader persuasive strategy with what 
theory (e.g. Porter, 1995), and empirics (e.g. Kahneman, 2012) demonstrate to be the way 
audiences cognitively process and use quantitative information. The anchoring effect of 
uncertain numbers about abuses, violence, and crime is further corroborated in the experimental 
survey conducted as part of this dissertation, see chapter five. The key insight we gain here is 
that advocates see themselves as primarily using numbers performatively to a much greater 
extent than they use them to convey any kind of consequential “truth-claims.” 
 
4.1.2 Advocates believe numbers offer complementary, descriptive value  
 
The belief that numbers are quantitative short-hand for qualitative statements meant to 
convey severity gets a bit tricky as advocates simultaneously describe what they deem as 
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secondary efforts to use quantification more analytically. Beyond capturing media attention, 
many interviewees share the conviction that their organization’s most important work is 
qualitative in nature; any quantitative component is only complementary. As G10 said, “We're 
using quantitative research to bolster the qualitative, case-based research that we're doing on the 
ground.”27 The approach is usually to try to derive some analytic value from data by conducting 
simple descriptive analyses of the information available to them. Typically, interviewees 
describe plotting data patterns or simple statistics like percentages, averages and rates as a way to 
amplify what they know about a phenomenon in an anecdotal way. “It's really like the stories of 
the individual person who's affected, coupled with the data, [used to] impact those decision 
makers so they get on board, or at least get moved to neutral, those kinds of things. Those are 
really our goals.”28  
 
This complementary role of quantification is sometimes described by interviewees as a 
way to conduct “sanity checks” on how they understand the qualitative investigation of the 
organization. One such interviewee emphasizes that in a qualitative way, “we're gesturing as 
accurately as we can at a large truth, which is that, I can anecdotally tell you from my experience 
as an analyst, who the players are, which groups are rising, which groups are falling, which ones 
are staying about the same.”29 However, advocates’ use of numbers as corroboration to their 
qualitative insights can be a slippery slope into what Best characterizes as non-intentional misuse 
of numbers. For one, the imperfect nature of data means that data bias could lead to confirmation 
bias. However, because advocates downplay the overall role of numbers in their research process 
– and many times quantification work is done by non-experts or temporary consultants as 
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resources permit – the overall belief by advocates about the inconsequential nature of 
quantitative claims (as seen in their rhetorical use) conflicts with their attempts to use data more 
analytically. The positioning of simple analytic quantitative claims as secondary may cloud their 
recognition of such bias. Viewing numbers as having secondary role also conflicts with what we 
know to be the strong anchoring power of numbers in information processing by audiences.  
 
Analytically, what advocates say they most want to do with data and numbers is make 
comparisons to emphasize their points. In an example from Colombia, one organization that 
provides descriptive analysis of violent incidents emphasizes that their goal is to make claims 
about escalation, improvements or simply the unwavering continuity of repression. C4 credits his 
organizations’ ongoing statistical monitoring of violations over time and perpetrator to bringing 
much needed attention to the escalating and permanent violence in Colombia in the 1980s, 90s 
and 2000s. “Although with work that was not too sophisticated, but was judicious,” we were able 
to reach “not only the Colombian population, the Colombian authorities, but also the members of 
the UN Human Rights Commission, UN subgroups and labs, and the special rapporteurs on 
extrajudicial executions and torture.”30  
 
One of the biggest limitations in the use of numbers based on uncertain data (Best, 2012; 
Landman & Godhes, 2013; Merry, 2016). Such numerical reasoning can be misleading since we 
do not know the reference frame or denominator that would guide meaningful comparisons. One 
interviewee used numbers in this kind of way as he described available data about the number of 
known nefarious groups: “… [What] I can tell you is that the difference between 250 and 7,000 
is stark. The difference between 60,000 in the UK and 7,000 in the US is stark... That kind of 
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supports your position right there.”31 However, comparisons such as these amount to what Best 
calls “apples and oranges.” Overall, the analytical use of simple statistics, seen as having a 
secondary and complementary role, is also meant to advance an agenda. Advocates, however, 
tend to downplay the importance of quantification in their overall research and communication 
strategies.  
 
4.1.3 Advocates also find numbers offer political “cover”  
 
Only a few interviewees discussed their work in terms of following “rigorous” 
quantitative methods, whereby rigor here means abiding by well-established procedures of 
inquiry to arrive at scientifically valid inferences (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Marquart, 
2017; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 2016).  Only one of the organizations discussed rigor in terms of 
holding themselves accountable to expert methodological peers as well as the human rights 
community.  However, what’s interesting is that even the more rigor-prone organizations 
emphasize the performative value of the numbers. G9 provides a specific example of a 
quantitative analysis being very useful to advocacy partners in abroad, “… not necessarily 
because the scientific findings are new or different, but because they add a layer of security. It's 
still really dangerous in most parts of [country X] to suggest going and investigating these cases, 
and so to be able to say, ‘Hey, it's not us. It's the scientific model,’ is actually really useful to 
them.”32  
 
While scholars make astute distinctions between the use of statistics for persuasive 
advocacy and statistics that are inferentially valid (Simone and Satterthwaite, 2016), we see how 
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inferential statistics also serve a rhetorical and persuasive function. Numbers clearly matter to 
advocates, sometimes for the empirical substance they convey, but most often for the attention 
and reliability numbers are seen to communicate. Overall, advocates describe the main role of 
numbers in advocacy to be performative. As G19 explains, “The numbers provide a very quick 
and easy way for the policy maker to both connect with the issue, and to give them evidence that 
making the advocacy change that we were requesting was the right thing to do, and giving them 
cover to do so.”  
 
4.2 Advocates have a discerning sense of data limitations  
Despite the value advocates ascribe to numbers for human rights advocacy, interviewees 
are not blind to the many issues that threaten the reliability of human rights data. All offer rich 
examples about the ways the data are difficult to access and collect, and how they are prone to 
under-registration and unevenness in their coverage and quality. In this section, I include 
examples of the many ways advocates talk about the limitations of human rights violations data. 
 
Interviewees from international and U.S. focused groups talk about how social and 
political dimensions of violence create gaps or interruptions in data creation processes. For 
example, U28 talks about how the perpetrators deliberately hide their tracks, making data about 
their presence spotty. “They may go dark for months,” he says, which affects the passive daily 
and monthly monitoring counts. Another interviewee discussed how lack of trust in official 
institutions leads to data bias. “If you're from a community that's targeted by law enforcement, 
African Americans who are traditionally subjected to police brutality, you’re much less likely to 
trust law enforcement, and then less likely to report. Same with Muslim communities who are 
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targeted in national security and terrorism investigations, much less likely to report to law 
enforcement...[furthermore] it’s actually not mandatory for states to report this data.”33 Other 
groups describe how fear and coercion prevent reporting. For example, in the context of human 
trafficking data, another interviewee said: “Victims are having a hard time identifying as victims 
of trafficking because a lot of them are socialized to believe that terrible labor conditions are the 
norm or what should be expected.”34 Advocates working on sexual violence talk at length about 
victims resistance to disclosure given “stigma.”35 Many more examples of observational 
challenges where mentioned, including difficulties in learning about incidents from certain 
countries and challenges in verifying the veracity of online open source content. Overall, the 
anecdotes interviewees offers suggest that the data about “who did what to whom” is highly 
uneven in quality.36 
 
From advocates in Colombia, obstacles to registration and instability in their data streams 
were also top-of-mind. For example, one participant talked about the obstacles to documenting 
paramilitary violence over time. He describes how it was only when the paramilitaries 
demobilized in the early 2000’s and offered oral testimony did the Colombian state really begin 
to register past crimes committed by these groups. However, most streams of data rely on victim 
testimony. Having worked closely with victims for years, he describes the reticence he perceives 
people to have about reporting their experiences of victimization to the Colombian government 
agencies who they see as complicit in the violence. Even with the incentive for reparations 
offered, victims have said to him that “for political convictions, I am not about to take money in 
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36 “Who did what to whom?” is the name of a book by Patrick Ball (1996) where he lays out the units of analysis most human 
rights practitioners aim to count. 
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the name of my dead relative, and much less am I going to ask for it from the [state] 
perpetrator.”37 38 He believes that even now, there is ongoing fear to report violations about the 
past: “I think what we know least about is the real degree of violence committed by [formerly-
armed] groups post-demobilization… it’s still too risky to denounce.”39 Overall, he worries that 
while available data about human rights abuses are inevitably incomplete, statistics based on 
available data are nonetheless prominent. He reflects on what he calls “a conceptual error that I 
think we’ve had here (in Colombia) as we manage statistics.” He says, “We’ve always tried to 
bolster the statistic, ignoring or minimizing the under-registration or the fact that the figure I’m 
giving you is created in the context of war, so we confuse the data we know with reality.” In this 
way, he recognizes the core tension between data production and the use of data on human rights 
violations.  
 
Other Colombian interviewees talk about changes in their resources and their lack of 
access to certain regions of the country and how these issues affect the human rights data. One 
interviewee notes, “When I saw what we were able to monitor in 2009 compared with what we 
have the capacity to monitor today, to what we could confirm in 2009 to what we can confirm 
today, it’s effectively 40% more.”40 According to another Colombian interviewee,  “it is not 
possible to have a number on how many people have been assassinated …because everyone 
counts different things, and in reality, they are not comparable, furthermore one same source will 
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38 One of the largest databases of conflict-related victims in Colombia, the Registro Unico de Victimas, is collected with the 
purpose of administrating reparations benefits to eligible victims.  
39 Participant C8 
40 Participant C2 
 
66 
count one thing at first and then later count something else, and then another and another. They 
are not always clear about their criteria…they are not always transparent.”41 
  
All interviewees talk at length about data limitations; some go on to discuss the 
implications of this uneven data quality in the ways the data later get used. The main issue they 
bring up is commensurability. For example, G18 said, “You know, there are comparisons to be 
made but you can't just take our data and compare it to another data set and imply that they are 
directly comparable, and that's been done, I think, … with the particular intention of not only 
supporting the cause of that issue was, but somehow to diminish the [other] issues at the [same] 
time.”42 Another interviewee, after describing how her organization uses raw counts to compare 
whether the data increased or decreased from one year to the next, confessed, “I personally think 
it’s problematic, it’s problematic at least in a technical way because there are a lot of things that 
influence whether we can count more or less homicides, we’ve expanded [regionally], we have 
more people in the field, and because we’re drawing a lot on information produced by others to 
know what’s happening, and to count.”43 Still another researcher worries that when they focus 
too much on what is visible, they may forget to invest in issues or areas that are less visible: 
“…we need to make sure we're not just following the big, shiny ball in our research….”44 
Advocates own admission and discussion of data being unsuitable for making comparisons sits 
in stark contrast with the strong and confident expressions of the value of numbers. So, while the 
interviews confirm that practitioners strategically use the data to provide magnitude and patterns 
in data, they are at the same keenly aware of data limitations.  
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Overall, I find that the contrast between the value of number and the inherent limitations 
of data exists as a palpable tension for advocates. “All of that kind of confusion and nuance and 
imperfectness [in data], that's a great tension to point to,” noted one participant.45 Should data-
driven arguments be made with such data? One interviewee struggled with this dilemma, “…this 
goes back to the tension I had mentioned between promoting the importance of data but then not 
wanting to tear it down so much, but then needing to tear it down.”46  
 
4.3 Advocates contend with tension between numbers and data uncertainty  
One of my main findings from interviews is that advocates are aware of the data and 
uncertainty tension and that most attempt to address it to varying degrees. I find three ways that 
interviewees describe their efforts to mitigate the tension. The first is via technical efforts such as 
improving data collection and analysis. The second is to invest in educational efforts at their 
organizations, such as trying to improve staff’s data literacy as they present and cite numbers. 
Third, and by far the most common considerations I heard, were pragmatic and somewhat 
instinctive assessments of the costs and benefits of using uncertain numbers without risking 
rebuke – a style akin to a “satisficing” approach. Satisficing is a concept introduced by Herbert 
Simon (1956) to describe the behavior or cognitive heuristics people use to arrive at satisfying 
and sufficient choices that meet acceptable thresholds when optimal solutions are not possible. 
As advocates described these pragmatic assessments, I heard some consistent themes emerge, so 
much so that I believe there may be some stable, if as-of-yet inexplicit, norms guiding advocates 
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to consider numbers “good enough” to use for the purposes of persuasive advocacy. In this 
section, I will briefly mention the technical and education efforts mentioned, and then focus on 
the ideas that I believe constitute a standard for “good enough” numbers for advocacy. 
 
Briefly, with respect to improving data collection, all interviewees at organizations that 
produce data about human rights violations talk about trying to collect more and better data as a 
core part of their fact-finding work. They search for more data, especially from repressive 
contexts where international groups have a hard time visiting for field investigations, 
increasingly relies on open source content uploaded to social media by victims, perpetrators, and 
bystanders or shared through a variety of private platforms. Much effort is going into the 
challenges of verifying the veracity of online content.47 In Colombia, organizations seek access 
to data about human rights violations via ad hoc agreements with outside organizations. The 
hope is that by collating many sources, they will have a more complete picture for their newest 
iteration of numbers reported. However, one interviewee pointed out that while collecting more 
data is valuable, it likely means her organization’s monthly monitoring is not really 
commensurate over time, and each iteration may include a different set of underlying sources.48 
This is worth noting too because it highlights how if such changes to the data generation process 
are not explicitly communicated to end-users, this not only exacerbates the problem of data 
uncertainty, but gets lost as guiding interpretive frameworks for posterity.  
 
A relatively small set of interviewees in this study talk less about collecting more data, 
and more about employing more “rigorous” statistical techniques to address inherent data 
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limitations. By rigorous, I mean that the numbers and analyses presented to stakeholders are held 
to social scientific standards of quantitative research (Marquart, 2017; Satterthwaite and Simone, 
2016). One organization, and somewhat of an outlier in this study, is dedicated to serving as a 
scientific partner to other human rights organizations around the world. Several others mention 
having formed partnerships with statisticians to produce some specific quantitative output for a 
specific campaign or issue. Representatives from two groups mention that their organizations’ 
have taken steps in this direction, by hiring full-time in-house quantitative analysts. It is worth 
noting that in all of these efforts, the core tension with data uncertainty does not go away. What 
varies in the extent to which human rights advocates address the uncertainty in some explicit 
way, which I will discuss below. Because collecting more data or doing more rigorous analysis is 
resource-intensive and sometimes technically-prohibitive, a few organizations have decided that 
to take more of an educational approach to mitigating data uncertainty issues, akin to what Root 
(2016) describes as quantitative literacy trainings.  
 
4.3.1 Advocates share consistent ideas about what constitutes “good enough” numbers  
 
I listened to several interviewees talk through an implicit cost/benefit analysis and reason 
that the numbers that exist – whether they produce them or cite others’ figures – are “good 
enough.” Among the U.S. and international practitioners interviewed, doing more extensive 
quantitative work seemed beyond what they can aspire to with available resources. “It's just not 
feasible to do a broad-based quantitative study on the population that's been affected by a 
conflict because the scale that we're talking about is quite massive, and we're a team of about a 
dozen.”49 Some advocates explicitly distinguish that what they believe to be needed to achieve 
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scientifically accurate numbers would require “way more energy than is certainly necessary for 
strictly advocacy purpose.”50 For advocacy, there appears to be a more relaxed data standard and 
conscious trade-off with producing scientifically reliable numbers. G17 put it this way: 
 
 “[While] it would be really helpful to have those bigger numbers, I feel a little 
conflicted about it morally because to do a prevalence study, you're going out and finding 
and counting all of these people who are trafficked without actually tracking them and it 
takes a tremendous amount of resources to get that number. So, there's a small part of me that 
... Well, there's a large part of me that doesn't want to spend that kind of influx of resources 
that would give us that number could do so much in terms of just adding more shelter beds in 
the US or more ... Even just training resources for prosecutors. There's so much you can do 
with that money.”51 
 
Among my study participants, I find practices akin to Jasanoff’s proposal in action for the 
human rights advocacy context. As Science and Technology Studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff 
(2014) encourages for the role of science at the intersection of law and policy, legal scholars may 
be well-served to “set aside [the] some-what one-sided obsession with the quality of science,” 
and instead ask “how science might best aid and advance the purposes of the law?” (p.1729). She 
distinguishes what may be “high-quality knowledge” from “serviceable truths,” ultimately 
calling for some context-specific and pragmatic approximations to research products. In the 
human rights context, advocates recognize that there are scientific standards for the production of 
numbers, and while some aspire to those standards, most appear to accept a departure from those 
standards given the limitations of the data and the constraints of bringing attention to human 
rights abuses. The departure from ideal standards is not reckless; it aims to be principled.  
 
Below, I analyze and find that advocates have pretty consistent and pragmatic ideas 
guiding their judgments about the numbers they say they are willing to use and how to present 
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them. Four ideas surfaced consistently: 1) numbers are considered temporary (not the final 
word), 2) conservative (low bounds), 3) empirical (based on data, not guesswork), and 4) 
communication of methods and data limitations should be transparent. This contrasts with 
prevailed dichotomous depictions. For example, Cohen and Green (2012) pose that human rights 
advocates’ need to draw attention to human rights abuses creates an incentive for “drama,” 
creating inherent incentives to producing “suspect facts” (p.446). They draw on the example of 
an unfounded statistic claiming that 75% of women had been raped during the Liberian civil war. 
They offer a theory whereby the incentive for “drama” in the short-term conflicts with the need 
for organizational credibility in the “long-term.” As we will see, the advocates included in this 
study do not perceive their terrain under those stark parameters. 
 
4.3.1.1 Four aspirations: empirical, temporary, conservative, and transparent 
 
“Very often we are able to give our best assessment, if you like, and it's not just 
guesswork. It's based upon the best information out there and available to us…the main thing is 
to not seek to exaggerate or inflate, to be clear about if there are methodology limitations or 
otherwise, but to present the information we have just as credibly as we can.”52 
 
In the quote above, G23 captures what I heard time and again: Advocates have low 
tolerance for guesses and falsehoods to advance their issues, they attempt to use available, 
empirical information and communicate it to audiences in what that will protect credibility. Just 
as Porter suggests that the power of numbers is less about accuracy and more about the 
appearance of rule-following, I find that advocates satisfice to this standard. They look to 
produce or cite data made on the basis of agreed upon categories and efforts to systematically 
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classify events into them, even if that process ends up being messy and incomplete.53 Many 
emphasize the importance for numbers to have a documentary back-up. In the words of one 
respondent, “we often have to say, at least X number, and we can provide names.”54 In 
Colombia, similarly, C8 noted that his organization’s audiences want to know that any number 
provided is supported by names of the people counted. They said that it is for this reason that 
they opted out of seeking a more inferential approaches to estimating the number of people killed 
in the Colombian conflict. For advocates, it is safe to rely on data that is based on known 
incidents or people and that is produced by systematic classification efforts. While such data may 
have an uncertain relationship with the universe of violence in question, it arguably meets the 
threshold for what Porter’s says is the essence of objectivity – i.e., distance from subjectivity. 
Thus, ongoing and systematic efforts to monitor and classify known incidents of violence and 
abuse, which may be far from meeting scientific standards of data reliable for inference, arguably 
are sufficient to create distance from subjectivity – i.e., to project objectivity – thus guarding 
against critiques of exaggeration and bias. 
 
While interviewees stress that advocacy numbers must have some observational record 
behind them, they also stress the temporary quality of numbers. As one advocate put it, numbers 
are “by definition, a snap shot in time, … out of date almost immediately.”55 These temporary 
and incomplete counts are not intended as accurate portrayals, but rather to convey a sense of 
urgency to the situation. “[We] have no pretension of saying this is everything that happened in 
                                               
53 The production of categories is often highly contentious and political, the subject of lots of debate and disagreement behind the 
scenes. This is the subject of much debate among NGOs in Colombia. Merry (2016) describes the politics and ultimately the 
pragmatism of arriving at consensus categories in the context of human rights governance forums. However, once agreed upon 
and used for implementing counts, the politics largely disappear from public view. Recall that part of the uncertainty in data is 
how the ultimately agreed upon categories may include or excludes large swathes of the phenomena of interest.  
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the country, it only refers to what we know,” explained a Colombian advocate.56 The actual 
number is meant to trigger attention, as mentioned above. Importantly, it is seen as sufficient for 
this near-term and immediate context, and not as a consequential claim, either to scientific 
quantification standards or data-driven decision-making or long-lasting claims of magnitude. 
Still further, advocates overwhelmingly feel that as long as numbers are “conservative” and 
specifically described in their reports as minimums, they achieve their attention-impelling goal 
while staving off rebuttal and critique. “I think our position is very clearly that iterative 
improvements and measurements as we progress are better than not doing anything or trying to 
provide any type of answer.”57 Overall, this perception of numbers as temporary and 
conservative appears to ease the risk to organizational credibility or the possibility that numbers 
are found to be inaccurate at a later time.  
 
Finally, as expressed in the quote by G23 above, a key idea expressed by most 
interviewees as an ideal for using ‘good enough’ numbers is credible communication. In this 
vein, most participants invoke the notion of transparency about methods and data limitations. 
“As long as the methodology is quite transparent, and as long as the source is quite 
straightforward in terms of the limitation of what they've done, I think journalists can then make 
a judgment call and decide whether a number is worth reporting or not.”58 However, while the 
notion of transparency came up often as key feature of ‘good enough’ numbers, further 
discussion revealed that transparency as an ideal is experienced more as a trade-offs than as a 
guiding principle, as I analyze below.  
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4.3.2 While advocates express transparency as an ideal, it is rarely realized 
 
As we saw in the Chapter 2 Literature and Theoretical Framework, scholars have been 
increasing their calls for more transparency within the human rights community about their 
production of knowledge – and specifically in relation to data-based claims about human rights 
violations (Cohen & Green, 2012; Greenhill, 2010; Price & Ball, 2015b; Root, 2016; 
Satterthwaite & Simeone, 2016). The calls for transparency simultaneously implicitly hold that 
conveying to audiences more information about how data are produced and analyzed – as well as 
disclose the limitations of the data – audiences will be in a better position to substantively 
comprehend the data and to scrutinize its reliability. These same scholars also sometimes make 
sweeping statements suggesting that if advocates offer more transparency to audiences, they will 
benefit with increased credibility for their organization.  
 
Aligned with these general ideas, interviewees in this study also express transparency as a 
high-level aspiration for themselves and as important to assess fact-based human rights claims 
produced by others. When asked to explain their approach to such transparency, most spoke 
about their increased investment in methodological description. However, when probed 
specifically about whether they value and practice disclosing specific information about the 
limitations inherent in data on which quantitative claims rest, we begin to get a better sense of 
how the ideal of transparency about data production and uncertainty in human rights statistics 
becomes complicated by various incentives and disincentives participants perceive to be inherent 




4.3.2.1 Methods sections are often high-level  
 
Most, but not all, participants report that their organization has invested effort to be more 
transparent about their research process. Primarily, they talk about enhancing the methodology 
sections in their published reports. For example, one advocate I interviewed said that the 
organization’s explanation of their methods “is much more robust… than we used to have, and 
saying what we do and what we don't know about the people that we've interviewed.”59 
Participants describe pretty consistent and formulaic approaches: “Look, here's where I was able 
to travel. Here's what I was able to do. I spoke to X number of people or whatever.”60 These 
kinds of sections are primarily aimed at communicating to audiences that there was a research 
process to support the reported information.  
 
Taking a closer look, however, many reveal that the reason methodological transparency 
is important is often more symbolic than substantive. Participants talk about methods sections as 
being important signals of credibility. G23 captures it in one phrase: “[Methods] are important in 
terms of establishing the credibility, I guess, of our work, but it's not necessary to the key 
advocacy message.”61  Providing substantive methodological detail about the data production 
was described as relatively marginal and sometimes inconvenient. One Colombian interviewee 
talked about the choice to exclude his survey methods from a public facing report because lay 
audiences would not be interested, “the report tried not to be too technical about all the sampling. 
I added [details about methodology] to the presentation as a technical appendix, but it doesn’t 
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appear in the publication.”62 A U.S. advocate echoed this sentiment. “Well, you know, we aren't 
releasing pure view scientific reports. That's the first thing. So it shows up less in the sense that 
we don't have a methods section in which we address the weaknesses…. Doesn't mean that all of 
our methodology stuff doesn't really hold up, it just means at times we're gonna have different 
tactics towards a similar goal.”63 Much of this sentiment appears to be rooted in an assessment 
that audiences just want you to get to the point. Of note, Lupia (2013) analyzes the 
communication of science in politicized environments and finds that science communicators 
often overestimate their audiences capacity to pay attention to scientific findings and 
methodological underpinnings. In the human rights contexts, it appears that advocates anticipate 
audiences’ capacity and (little) interest in this information more than some academics.  
 
With regard to the substance of methodological description, some participants actually 
feel stifled by what they perceive to be a lack of interest in methodology by their audiences. “I 
think the demand for knowing about the methodology is less than how much we would actually 
like to talk about it.”64 A U.S.-based advocate said, “I don't know that there is a heck of a lot of 
interest, certainly not by the public. I find, frankly, among policymakers, that the interest around 
methodology frequently comes from people that are already deeply skeptical of the analysis that 
you're doing…”65 However, with respect to this skepticism, there is a sense that political 
detractors will take a more political tack than a methodological one. As one respondent said, 
“Yeah, I think some of the more unscrupulous governments and state actors don't really care, to 
be honest. They don't like what we're saying and they want us gone basically. That's why we'll 
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often get accused of fake news and things like that... Even heads of state have said that about 
some of our reporting, and they just don't even want to enter a dialogue about our methodology, 
and why we think they should do more to account for X, Y, and Z.”66  
 
As a whole, I find that interviewees discuss their consideration of providing 
methodological description in relation to short-term pragmatic trade-offs. From interviewees’ 
perspectives, it appears that vis-a-vis committed adversaries, more transparent methods will 
rarely serve as a bulwark against critique, and with the media or more sympathetic audiences, 
there is little interest in substantive methodological discussion. The relatively small community 
calling for more transparency is making appeals to higher research standards (which advocates 
do not appear to think are required strictly for advocacy work) or to consequences on credibility, 
which as we will see, does not appear to be at stake if advocates follow “good enough” standards 
in providing quantitative information for advocacy or when the numbers play a relatively small 
complementary role. In sum, while methodological transparency is seen as an ideal, it is not 
considered to be required for advocacy, and can at times be at odds with it. Thus, there appears 
to be little incentive for advocates to develop this part of their reporting beyond current practices.  
 
Unsurprisingly, when interviewees put themselves on the receiving end of human rights 
reports published by others, some find methods sections to be generally short and lacking detail. 
One respondent complained “…in their reports, they normally include methodology and it's very 
frustrating when I'm looking at it and trying to understand what's going on and I don't quite 
understand it.”67 Another respondent similarly described that even when working in partnership 
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with local human rights groups, “it’s really difficult to get the groups to articulate in a way that's 
useful to us how they're collecting the data.” These short-term trade-offs in providing 
methodological detail, while functional and pragmatic in immediate advocacy contexts, could 
have long-term implications for how the data is used and interpreted in future use contexts, such 
as comparisons of data over-time, decision-making, and historical truth-seeking efforts. I will 
return to some of the potential downsides of such limited methodological transparency below.  
 
4.3.2.2 Advocates describe deterrents and risks in presenting data limitations 
Advocates distinguish the description of methodological procedures from more specific 
detail about the relative strengths and limitations of the data collected and used in other parts of 
reports or messages. In fact, interviews reveal that communicating specifically about data 
uncertainty – the limitations of data used in relation to quantitative claims they are used to make 
– is far more complicated.  
 
Several interviewees talk about the intention to provide transparent communication about 
data limitations.  Excerpts from my conversation with one interviewee on the topic echo the 
sentiment of some of the groups that take pride in their research efforts and ethics.  
 
“Well certainly I think every research team wants to convey [data limitations]... 
…I think the problem becomes that in translation to what the public is interested in, those 
caveats lose salience or lose priority because that's not typically what the focus of a lot of 
these interviews become…. in communication to the broader public, I think people start 
to care less and less about those nuances…the best you can do is push for caveats, 
indicating this is under-representation, children are not well-represented, that [a certain 
region] is not well-represented due to data availability issues, but honestly, it's really not 
easy to get the general public to even care about these caveats.”68  
                                               




G15 went on to talk about how she encourages her audiences be more critical information 
consumers: “Don't be so eager to have this one-line soundbite with just the number without any 
context.”69 Another interviewee was similarly disheartened in what she perceives as a lack of 
appreciation for expressions of uncertainty. Referring to her presentation of statistical estimates 
to a group of policymakers, G9 recalls, “They wanted no discussion of ranges, no bounds, no 
uncertainty, no ... They were just like, "It's a number. It's the number of names that have been 
written down. Just tell me how many it is." And I was like, ‘Here's the range.’”70  
 
A much larger set of interviewees focused less on the lack of demand for data 
uncertainty information, and more on their own dilemmas with providing such information. 
Participants raised three main concerns with communicating data uncertainty to audiences: such 
information can be 1) unhelpful and uninformative, 2) unreliably read, and 3) cast the source as 
an unreliable information producer. All three of these issues, raised more as intuitions by 
respondents than as demonstrated outcomes, nonetheless resonate with scholarly findings about 
the potential perils of communicating uncertainty.  
 
The first common theme was the idea that being transparent about data limitations can be 
unhelpful and uninformative, creating more noise than signal for their audiences.  This echoes 
general concerns that people are poor at processing uncertainty information (Kahneman, 2011) 
and that policymakers want compressed sharp information (Lupia, 2013). For example, C4 
overheard a conversation among some ambassadors complaining about missing data in his 
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organizations’ violations lists, calling the data “‘useless…filled with NNs and cases with no 
location information. We don’t know if a record is one, two or three people.’”71 What to do with 
missing data, and whether to convey it, is a common issue. G18 worries about how to use and 
convey such missing data when making quantitative claims. “Often we just leave out unknowns 
in graphic representations because sometimes there are so many that it would distort the data. 
Then sometimes we leave them in, so you even see that in one graphic representation where 
we've chosen to leave out and in another to keep in…that's where we put the asterisks and say 
‘Of the number known.’” In this case, we see G18 grappling with the idea that the data 
visualization may be misleading in the first place, and that the caveat tends to be uninformative. 
Overall, there is a sense that caveats such as these can equally create confusion because they do 
not add information about its degree or implications of the missing data. On the topic of under-
registration in datasets of victims, another participant reasoned it was best not to raise the issue 
precisely because they do not have a useful way to help audiences make sense of it, “No, we 
only speak of what we know, we do not touch the topic of under-registration because we have 
no idea how to measure it, we would only be speculating, so if we could measure it, we would, 
but without that, we do not even mention it.”72 Overall, there is a sense that pointing to data 
uncertainty without offering some additional insight can be less, rather than more informative.  
 
Another potential risk participants see is that information about uncertainty will be 
unreliably read. One participant said she received positive feedback about her organization’s 
decision to include caveats, with comments such as “it’s very interesting that you make that 
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clarification because now one knows better what to stick to in principle.”73 More often, however, 
interviewees worry that uncertainty will be negatively read as them downplaying the relevance 
of the cases that are known, as another interviewee pointed out: “so when one puts too much 
emphasis on the under-registration it’s like leaving a subtext that one thinks the reported number 
of victims are just a few, no?” Perhaps another interviewee best captures the fine line advocates 
are considering about the possible ways in which uncertainty information will be read “…it can 
be very positive or very counterproductive, we have to look at the context. If demobilized 
guerillas are being killed and we come out and say well the stats are very uncertain, one almost 
looks complicit…so we have to look very carefully at the context.. one thing is whether there is 
uncertainty, and a very different thing is that everything is OK… there are a whole range of 
distortions that are based on statistical uncertainty to say ‘nothing is happening here.’”74 These 
intuitions about information being negatively read are consistent with empirical evidence in other 
contexts, whereby verbal expression of uncertain care unreliably read (Wallsten and Budescu, 
1995), or are understood with inverted valence or ‘boomerang effects,’ effects (e.g., regarding 
climate policies and with the presentation of weak forensic evidence in courtrooms (Martire et 
al., 2014).  
 
Finally, a last common concern is that uncertainty will make the data appear unreliable, 
which in turn makes the data producer appear less valuable. As C8 put it: “to sustain an NGO, it 
is not too profitable for someone to say, ‘I present these data, but let me clarify, the under-
registration can be terrible, we’re in the context of war, no?! The presenter must say, this is 
reliable, it’s valuable information. One doesn’t present an product to also give all the ‘buts,’ 
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maybe it’s an issue of survival of the data producer, that’s what’s at play, no?”75  And, at the 
most extreme, one interviewee shared his concern that uncertainty information could be used as 
political ammunition, “it puts you at a rhetorical disadvantage to go and say well these are all the 
... 'cause you're basically putting a neon sign towards your detractors to say, this is why this is 
bullshit…”76  
 
These various issues, from the lack of demand for uncertainty information to the 
disincentives and potential risks for supplying uncertainty information, are not unique to the 
human rights community. They echo disincentives expressed for communicating uncertainty in 
many politized contexts and even disincentives to publish negative results in academia (Nosek, 
Spies, & Motyl, 2012). The point here is that they are present issues that advocates grapple with 
as they consider the ideal of transparency for their immediate advocacy contexts. Being 
transparent inevitably creates a widely-shared dilemma, as reflected in the words of G16, “I 
would not be in favor of leaving that information, which I think is very important, out of 
advocacy work for the sake of making it more compelling, although, not to say that I would 
disagree if someone were to come out otherwise and try to downplay that caveat in service of 
some advocacy goal.” G16 captures the tension between the desire to be transparent about 
uncertainty and the potential, multifaceted deterrents for actually being so. The foreseen 
cognitive and political resistance leaves an unclear path for advocates as to how to handle the 
question of transparency about data uncertainty. What comes across strongly is that the 
consideration of the trade-offs mostly sound like short-term pragmatism rather than long-term 
considerations about how this information will be used in contexts beyond immediate advocacy. 
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Next, I look at a small sample of how methodology and data limitations are actually conveyed in 
a small sample of Human Rights Watch (HRW) publications.  
 
4.3.2.3 Preliminary review of HRW reports 
 
To deepen our comprehension of how advocates communicate numbers, methods and 
data limitations in their publications, I conducted a pilot study of a small random sample of 
twelve HRW reports, six from 2012 and six from 2018.77 Given the reduced time I had to 
conduct this complementary, yet initial analysis, I focused on reports written by HRW because 
they are arguably one of the most influential organization producing regular human rights 
reports.  
 
In the analysis of this small sample of reports, I find HRW’s communication practices to 
be quite similar to what advocates are sharing in interviews and to what has been found in 
previous similar studies (e.g., Satterthwaite and Simone 2016). First, while HRW is primarily a 
qualitative research enterprise, almost all reports include quantitative claims (10 out of 12). 
These quantitative claims function just as interviewees suggest – either as an empirical way to 
demonstrate that incidents are occurring at a high frequency or to complement a more qualitative 
argument in the report, drawing on data that show a trend exists.78 Methodology sections tend to 
be generic, briefly outlining “what was done” to collect the information used in the report. 
Limitations and caveats mentioned in this section are in relation to overall research limitations 
                                               
77 Many thanks to my research assistant, Alexa Patrick-Rodriguez for her help coding the reports. The methodology for this study 
in included in the methods section above. As a reminder, it’s a small study given the limited time to conduct it. 
78 An example of an “a lot” statement looks like this: “Between 1996 and 2011, city police made 586,320 arrests for possession 
of marijuana in public view in violation of New York Penal Law § 221.” (HRW 2012, p.10). An example of a “bolster claims” 
statement looks like this: “An analysis of marijuana arrests in the period 2004-2008 revealed 48 blacks arrested for marijuana 




(which tend to be primarily qualitative in nature), rather than addressing specific flaws in 
quantitative data used in other parts of the report. Overall, these findings support the expressed 
sentiment that methods sections are more general and symbolic than substantive.  
 
In other sections of the reports where specific numeric claims appear, rarely does one 
find language about the limitations to the quantitative claims (only 1 out of 12 included 
something resembling a caveat statement). The common way reports note the lack of precision to 
their numeric claims is to include ‘approximate’ statements – phrases such as “more than” or “at 
least” (seen in 8 out of 10 reports). Overall, numbers in reports are communicated as confident 
claims, revealing little to nothing about data uncertainty. While these are preliminary findings 
based on a very small sample of reports and should be strengthened and validated with a larger, 
more representative sample, they are consistent with interviewees’ sentiment whereby “good 
enough” numbers with low transparency about the data back story is stable practice in human 
rights advocacy reporting.  
 
4.3.3 Methodological scrutiny is selective when advocates cite “authoritative numbers” 
 
For those organizations that rely on citing numbers produced by others, interviewees 
have a pretty consistent sense of where and how they look for numbers that they are willing to 
cite. For example, G26 said “…we do use numbers that have been collected by others, 
authoritative numbers, that's part of our advocacy all the time. I mean, I think it's hugely 
important.”79  
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A few respondents return to notions of transparency, or methodological disclosure, as 
being important. As G14 put it, “the types of sources that we would be looking at and be willing 
to cite as authoritative in our work would typically have a methodology because they would have 
pretty high bars in terms of the quality of their work.” But through my multiple conversations 
with advocates, it became clear that for the most part, methodological scrutiny is selective; just 
as most people, advocates use heuristics to determine source credibility (Chanthika, 2006). 
Methodological detail becomes important when the available numbers are produced by 
organizations that are relatively unknown to them. “I think the methodology matters more when 
it's your opponent's data than when it's your ally's data. It probably shouldn't be the case, but I 
think there's a bit of an echo chamber and sort of pumping out and trusting that those of us in this 
are all legit and have the same amount of rigor in our work. It's just not the truth, despite the 
perpetuating ethos or just environment.”80 In Colombia, C8 expressed a similar conviction, “One 
things that happens when we build reputations … is that society does not ask itself much about 
the route…Sometimes the findings is accepted or not depending on the reputation of the data 
producer.” So, this logic follows Porter’s theoretical explanation about the authority of numbers. 
He posits that when personal or institutional trust is low or unknown – in this case political trust 
– then trust in numbers has an opportunity to exert its power. In the case of human rights 
numbers, advocates’ enhanced scrutiny that the rules of objectivity have been properly 
implemented (in this case, a review of methodology) when other means of trust are “distant” – in 
this case, distant socially and politically – is aligned with Porter’s theoretical explanation. It also 
reveals how at times, transparency can be drawn upon for accountability, but may only be done 
so when other factors for sources’ credibility are weak. 
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By far, interviewees say they prefer to cite United Nations agencies or affiliates, which 
they say they trust, and overall feel will be well-received and pose little risk of rebuke. “Yeah, 
for the UN, … we don't necessarily look in depth at their methodology every time they put out a 
new report, we sort of assume that they're using the same methodology and that it's built on what 
they've done before.”81 However, many concede they know little about the methods of such 
organizations. At least four interviewees independently said they have found some UN numbers 
to be “flaky” and that inclusion of methods for the numbers they put out are “hit or miss.”82 One 
interviewee confessed, “In some cases people use very authoritative numbers that are actually 
very weak and very unconvincing.”83 It appears that if advocates can offset accountability for 
uncertain numbers to a ‘reputable’ organization, their own credibility can be protected. 
Elsewhere scholars have found that source credibility is primarily determined by perceived 
common interests and perceived relative knowledge, which offers analytic traction here. 
According to Alston and Knuckey (2016), dominant forms of trust in the human rights 
community usually come from shared commitments, values, and norms and less from social 
scientific disciplinary practices. 
 
Citing numbers that they accept as being weak is seen in a related way among Colombian 
and U.S. respondents. Several said they prefer to cite numbers from “official” institutions – 
usually government institutions – even if they know well that their numbers are incomplete and 
potentially biased. “You provide a figure that the state is telling you about its own behavior, who 
is going to refute that? To argue publicly, it is a powerful tool.”84 They feel they can avoid 
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rebuke and advance their agenda more if they can work with government numbers. Overall, just 
as advocates satisfice in their assessment of what numbers serve as “good enough” and to what 
(limited) degree they need to convey data uncertainty to audiences, they use pragmatic heuristics 
to assess which external numbers they can safely cite without having to invest too much time 
vetting methodological rigor. Much of what they share about these practices to be intuition and 
tacit knowledge about costs and benefits, rather than conclusion to which they have arrived as 
through much deliberation.  
 
Advocates appear quite aware of several of these tensions operating at the intersection of 
the production and consumption of quantitative measures of human rights violations, and their 
approach to dealing with the tension is inherently pragmatic. Among their biggest concerns, as 
one advocate put it, “people are pretty concerned about putting in something that can be 
rebutted.”85 However, based on these interviews, I find that irrespective of some degree of 
transparency about data uncertainty (and even sometimes thanks to a lack of transparency), using 
“good enough” numbers is perceived as effective and posing little risk to advocates in the way 
there are currently using them. Granted, these norms are quite permissive; they allow “flaky” 
numbers to pass, including potentially misleading comparisons by advocates themselves. They 
may also allow false, exaggerated or doctored numbers to pass. While they might be more 
careful if they anticipate challenges to numbers, interviewees were hard pressed to find cases 
involving themselves or others where political detractors focus their critique on the uncertainty 
of published numbers, their methods, or their limitations. 
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As we saw in case of the CNMH’s Enough Already! report, political considerations tend 
to outweigh methodological ones – allies rarely call each other out. While I did hear some vague 
mention that people see suspicious numbers occasionally, they share that those tend to get 
addressed among peers quietly. For example, “So for us to verify the numbers, it is a kind of 
cooperative exercise, where if we don't understand, if something doesn't add up, we try to go to 
the person who prepared that report for the government first and say, "Hey. Do you realize this 
calculation is off?" If we can't reach them, we try and meet the diplomats, brief them, so that they 
can send a message back to capital and say, "What's this?" We try and compare it to what we 




In conclusion, we see that for a few scholars and organizations, numbers are a way to 
“speak truth to power,” thus they aim for numbers to be rigorous, scientifically defensible, and 
transparent. This is especially so for high-stakes forums such as truth commission, courtrooms, 
and data-driven decision-making. G9 discusses when she considers it worthwhile to invest in 
producing rigorous numbers: 
 
“That's the million dollar strategic question that we're struggling with right now 
because internally, we're not convinced that that's ever particularly useful. But we 
recognize that [good enough numbers] are often what you need to open the door to get 
somebody to write a headline or a press release or have a meeting, to then get to what we 
think are the significantly more meaningful comparisons about all the usual stuff that we 
would do. What's the change in patterns of violence over time or space or ethnic group? 
Most people we find, can't figure out how to start there.” 
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However, for the majority of advocates in this study, numbers serve as a means to a more 
short-term, instrumental and low stakes end – usually to bring much needed attention to 
important issues. The fact that advocates disseminate uncertain numbers relatively freely does 
not necessarily mean those numbers are deceptive, as those who paint stark dichotomies of 
“good” and “bad” numbers might contend (Best, 2012). In the immediate term, the onus and 
liability to get accurate numbers, or even to present them more carefully is largely not a main 
worry for their use in advocacy contexts. As we will see in Chapter 5 Experimental Survey 
Findings, when numbers are used in a consequential scenarios like decisions-making, those 
numbers can shape outcomes significantly, and only highly directive messages of data 




Chapter 5 Experimental Survey Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
The main concern in this chapter is that over-reliance on uncertain data by 
decisionmakers. Even if it is the best available data, data with significant uncertainty can 
nonetheless provide a false sense of certainty to decision-makers. As we have seen in Chapter 4, 
groups trying to call attention to injustices and inequality put numbers based on uncertain data 
out into the work to trigger attention, and while advocates in my interview study reason that such 
numbers may come with relatively little risk in the advocacy context, such numbers about social 
issues nonetheless travel to other contexts (Andreas and Greenhill, 2010). Some scholars have 
expressed specific concern about partial and biased data and numbers having potentially harmful 
impact when taken out of the original context of production and use, and then used to influence 
real-world decision-making. In some examples, biased data has been shown to amplify racial and 
socio-economic bias in criminal justice contexts, enable funneling of attention and resources to 
only the most visible problems, undermine the credibility of human rights institutions, and 
privilege certain narratives over others (Cohen & Green, 2012; Kruger et al., 2013; Lum, 2017; 
Reydams, 2016; Starr, 2014).  
As we have seen, scholars from across disciplines are calling for more transparent 
communication of data limitations to audiences, especially when important decisions are at stake 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; Greenhill, 2010; O’Neil, 2016; Root, 2016; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 
2016; Tufekci, 2014). Given the expertise, cost and difficulties often involved in calculating 
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statistical bounds of uncertainty (Fariss, 2014; Kruger & Lum, 2015; Price & Ball, 2015b; T. B. 
Seybolt et al., 2013), an alternative recommendation to practitioners is to “confront limitations 
and bias [in data] through language” (Root, 2016, p. 364).  While calls for transparency are often 
rooted in ideas of accountability (Ananny & Crawford, 2018), calls for such transparency in the 
human rights community are also rooted in the idea that by expressing uncertainty, the 
communicator offers complementary information to audiences to buffer them from interpreting 
numbers with false precision or inaccuracy.  
But as described in detail in Chapter 2 Literature and Theoretical Framework, cognitive 
science and science communication scholarship reveals that communicating uncertainty 
effectively is not straightforward. Research from disparate scientific domains provide scattered 
insights on the challenges of communicating uncertainty. First, communicating uncertainty is 
often considered a risk in politized environments, and we have seen that human rights advocates 
in this study anticipate and attempt to minimize such risks. With respect to tobacco, climate 
policy and other public policy issues, Oreskes & Conway (2010) show how politicians distorted 
scientists’ expression of uncertainty to sow doubt in favor of their agendas. Other scholars 
advocate that it is important to help policymakers to be better consumers of uncertainty and to 
push back against “incredible certitude” in policy decision-making (Fischhoff, 2012; Manski, 
2018). In cognitive experiments testing specific implementations of uncertainty expressions, 
studies show that better decision outcomes can emerge from numerical expressions of 
uncertainty than linguistic ones (Budescu & Wallsten,1987; Martire et al., 2013; Joslyn & 
LeClerc ,2013; Budescu et al., 2012); that making explicit recommendations to decision-makers 
in the face of uncertainty is likely to lead to improved outcomes (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013; Joslyn 
et al., 2009); that “hedges” can increase perceptions of credibility of information providers 
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(Jensen, 2008) or at least not lower them (Retzbach & Maier, 2015), but can also weaken the 
perceived value of evidence in court (Martire et al., 2014; Kadane & Koehler, 2017). To support 
domains where uncertainty is seen to lead to better decisions, some scholars are exploring the 
best ways to visually convey uncertainty (Fernandes, Walls, Munson, Hullman, & Kay, 2018; 
Greis, Hullman, Correll, Kay, & Shaer, 2017; Hullman, 2016).  
Yet even in these other domains, the findings on communicating uncertainty are isolated 
and sometimes contradictory. In human rights contexts, while there are increased calls for 
communicating uncertainty in data to audiences, how to communicate uncertainty effectively 
remains an open challenge and the impact on decisions and perceptions of source credibility 
remain unknown. As seen, I began addressing this issue by interviewing human rights advocates 
on their views about using uncertain numbers and expressing data imitations to audiences. To 
gauge the impact of data produced in one context and then moved to decision-making context, I 
designed three human rights vignettes, accompanied by one of four different data uncertainty 
messages. I drew on science communication theory and human rights communication practices 
to design each message type (described below).  
As described in Chapter 3: Research Methods in detail, I implemented a between-subjects 
randomized control trial with 970 college graduates that included 6 experimental conditions (2 
controls and 4 treatments) which I tested across three different vignettes (6 x 3 design). More 
specifically, the purpose of the experiment was to collect evidence of whether there was any 
basis to thinking minor changes in uncertainty messages would shift outcomes in meaningful 
ways. Findings (presented in this chapter) confirm that when solitary numbers are presented with 
no uncertainty message, decisions significantly shift in accordance to the numeric information 
(compared to the same scenario with no numbers presented). Unsurprisingly, this confirms the 
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strong anchoring effect of the numbers, what Kahneman (2011) says is “one the most robust and 
reliable results of experimental psychology” (p. 119). The most interesting finding of this study 
is that only one message type consistently leads decisionmakers to attenuate their decisions in the 
face of numeric information – an uncertainty message I call “expert interception.”  In these 
messages, designed on the basis of insights Joslyn & LeClerc (2013), the presenter of 
information anticipates the anchoring effect of the number and the tendency of audiences to 
interpret numbers as representative of real-world trends (i.e., to not foresee or consider the 
impact of partiality and bias in available data) and explicitly indicates the dangers associated 
with doing so. The study also finds evidence in support of the idea of what Ball (2016) and 
others have called a “caveat fallacy,” which essentially refutes the idea that any linguistic hedges 
attenuate the impact of the anchoring effect. Finally, while science communication scholars have 
found that signaling uncertainty in scientific findings may either lead people to consider the 
information provider more trustworthy or at least not harm perceptions of trustworthiness 
(Jensen 2008; Retzbach and Maier, 2015), this study found trust scores vary with the way 
different uncertainty messages, at times remaining unaffected, but with the most “effective” 
message type (expert interception), trustworthiness slightly decreased. After presenting these 
findings in detail, I discuss some of the implications of these findings (along with some of their 
limitations) for scholarship and human rights practice. 
 
5.1.1 Sample Description 
 
Respondents were 57% women and 43% men. Respondents age was, on average, 39 
years old, with the minimum and maximum ages at 21 and 82 years old, and the standard 
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deviation at 11. Respondents took an average of sixteen minutes to complete the full survey. 
Data were collected via a customized data collection instrument on Qualtrics. I pre-tested the 
data collection instruments in March and August 2018 to refine vignettes and treatment 
language, mostly for reading comprehension. To determine the average effects presented below, 
I conducted OLS regression analyses.  
5.2 Main Findings 
What is the impact of different expression of data uncertainty on decisions and 
perceptions of source trust? 
 
5.2.1 Decisions  
 
To describe findings, I make the C1 control condition the main point of reference – that 
is, where numbers are presented to the decision-maker, but no uncertainty message is included. 
Figure 2 presents 6 (experimental conditions) x 3 (vignettes) results for decision means. To make 
results comparable across vignettes, decision means are standardized with respect to C1 as 
follows: . The horizontal axis presents the 6 experimental arms, and the vertical 
axis presents the percent change in the mean with respect to C1. The standard errors are included 
in vignette specific results in Figure 3 and in the regression tables, below. The challenges of 
plotting uncertainty in data visualizations is a whole other topic of research (Hullman, Qiao, 
Correll, Kale, & Kay, 2019).  
 
The three strongest findings that relate to the hypotheses are as follows: 1) the impact of 
including a “number, no uncertainty” (C1) versus “no number” (C0); 2) the consistently 
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significant impact of “expert interception” (T3) aimed to intercept the tendency to view numbers 
as representative of trends in reality, and 3) the consistently null effect of the “simple caveat” 
(T1) to sway decisions with respect to “number, no uncertainty” (C1). I discuss each of these in 
detail below.  
Figure 1: Decision Mean Standardized relative to C1 
 
* Light dotted lines just guide the eyes by vignette, to see differences across the discrete treatment 
conditions. For example, for the “evidence-based sentencing” vignette (orange), the mean for C0 has a 





5.2.1.1 The Power of Numbers 
Table 4: C0 (No Number) vs. C1 (Number) Decision Means87 
 
I find evidence in support of hypothesis 1 – that the inclusion of “numbers, no 
uncertainty” (C1) significantly shifts decision means with respect to the baseline where “No 
Number” (C0) were provided to guide the decision-maker. 
 
As seen in Figure 3, Numbers (with no uncertainty - C1) consistently serve as a signal for 
decision-makers. In the “evidence-based sentencing” scenario, we see that including a risk score 
(C1) leads, on average, to an 8-month longer sentence than not including the score at all. This 
finding is significant at the .1 level, just shy of being significant at the stronger .05 level.88 In the 
allocation of “health kits” to rape survivors, including Numbers (with no uncertainty - C1) of 
reported victims in two regions leads towards a proportional allocation of kits. In the 
“prosecution resources” case, as expected, the numbers of documented victims by ethnic group 
also led people to adjust towards a proportional allocation. Interestingly, in this case, people did 
not go as far as the numbers would indicate: a purely proportional allocation would have been 
                                               
87 N = 378 are respondents assigned to C0 and C1 experimental conditions. For the prosecution resources, I had to exclude 37 
records due to data entry errors. 
88 I am exploring why the shift between C0 and C1 is less pronounced than in the other two vignettes. Early exploration leads me 
to believe there is a tempering effect due to correlations between the sentencing decisions and people’s political views of the 
criminal justice system.  
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given 90% of available resources to one group and 10% to the other yet respondents only 
adjusted to a 65/35% division.   
5.2.1.2 Effective and Ineffective Uncertainty Messages 
 
In a Bayesian framework, we might consider the mean of C1 as people’s priors about 
how to evaluate numbers – what people’s allocation would be, on average, in the presence of 
numbers, no uncertainty. In this case, treatments effects could be understood as how people 
update in the face of uncertainty. The communication goal is to attenuate the priors (C1). In the 
specific vignettes, information providers want to attenuate the effect of the numbers because they 
are concerned that risk scores can amplify bias in crime data (“evidence-based sentencing” case), 
that resources may disproportionately favor the most visible victims (“health kits” case), and that 
uneven reporting of victims across ethnic groups may led to impunity for the perpetrators of 
victims with less documentation (“prosecution resources” case). So, how do people update in the 





Figure 2: Decision Means per Vignette 
         “Evidence-based sentencing” (left)            “Health Kits” (center)       “Prosecution Resources” (right) 
 
Vignette-specific results with the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals of the effect size for 






Table 5: Decision as Dependent Variable 
C1 vs. all treatments: 
 
In Figure 2: Decision Means per Vignette, we see the effects of each treatment in contrast 
with C1 (Number, no uncertainty). The red line indicates the mean at C1, and the intervals are 
the standard errors of the effect size of each treatment with respect to C1. Significant effects at 
the .05 level are those where standard errors do not cross the red line. 
 
Of the four treatment conditions, T3 (Expert interception) was the only type of 
uncertainty expression that consistently changes decisions in the direction indicated by the 
uncertainty message (drawing on the context-specific expertise of the communicator), and away 
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from the allocation suggested by the numbers provided. Recall that T3 is designed on the basis of 
insights from Joselyn and Leclerc (2013) on communicating uncertainty in weather forecasts. 
These messages have two key features: they 1) foresee and intercept common cognitive 
misinterpretations (thus allow people to think more carefully), and 2) relate the message to the 
decision task. In these scenarios, I designed language to intercept the common misinterpretation 
that data represents a reliable pattern in reality. It is encouraging to see that the effects of this 
message type hold in this different domain and across vignettes. This can be seen as strong 
evidence in support of hypothesis 3.  
 
Recall that T1 (Simple Caveat) was intended to be a signal of caution rather than an 
informative message (Crismore & Kopple, 1988). As predicted, T1 had no impact on decision-
makers in any of the vignettes, providing strong evidence in line with hypothesis 2. This supports 
the idea of a “caveat fallacy” (Ball, 2016). This is a similar effect to what was seen in the science 
journalism context, whereby the inclusion of hedges about scientific findings had little effect on 
what readers take away. Of course, all we can observe for now is the lack of effect, not the 
reasons why.  
It is worth noting that two other experimental conditions – T2 (Rich Background) and T4 
(Numeric CI) – had significant effects in the same direction of T3 (Expert Interception) for one 
vignette (the “health kits” scenario) but the effect was not significant nor consistent across the 
other two scenarios. The lack of consistent effect here is interesting and signals that more 
research is needed on the specific properties of each of these treatments as well as the contexts in 
which they are deployed. One initial hypothesis is that the effects of these two conditions are 
vignette-specific and more work is needed to identity the specific properties of the scenarios 
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where these messages have impact. Another hypothesis is that the boundary condition between 
T2 “rich background” and T3 “expert interception” requires added precision and the vignette-
specific versions tested here had subtle differences that need to be identified and refined (see 
Appendix B for the full language used for each of the three vignettes). The lack of effect of T4 is 
not too surprising, as previous findings about confidence intervals have been inconsistent: 
numeric expressions of uncertainty may lead people to more effective decision-making in some 
contexts (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013; Kadane & Koehler, 2018) and to be ignored in others 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When ignored, one possibility is that the lack of effect may be 
explained by “variance neglect” (Vivalt & Coville, 2018), a type of heuristic people use when 
reasoning with statistics. Overall, the importance of these two message types and the 
inconclusive results here suggests the need to generate and experimentally test further 
hypotheses about these important uncertainty messages.  
For  now, this study confirms on the one hand the anchoring effect of numbers on human 
decision-making, illustrates how “expert interception” messages can add information that de-
anchors the numbers to an extent, and that simple caveats have no effect.  
 
 
5.2.2 Trust in Information Provider 
 
According to Lupia (2013), source credibility is “the extent to which an audience 
perceives a communicator as someone whose words they would benefit from believing” 
(p.14051). Jensen, citing Karl Popper, argues that communicating scientific uncertainty helps 
maintain the trustworthiness of scientists, and found empirical evidence of this in the case of 
reporting science in the news. This finding was partially verified in another study, where 
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expression of uncertainty either helped or had no effect on perceptions of trustworthiness 
(Retzbach & Maier, 2015). I extended this logic to the communication of data uncertainty in 
these vignettes. Guided by the intent to “being transparent” about data limitations, 
communicators may signal to audiences that they have produced and analyzed the data as experts 
should and are thus credible. Indeed Heinzelman & Meier (2013) suggested that any inclusion of 
caveats by human rights practitioners in their reports may be motivated by this imagined gain. I 
hypothesized that the treatments would increase the perception of trustworthiness of the 
information provider (H4), but I do not find any of these uncertainty messages relate to 
meaningful gains or losses in source trust.   
 
Figure 3: Perceptions of Trust in Information Provider, Standardized to C1 
 
 
Figure 4: Perceptions of Trust in Information Provider 
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         “Evidence-based sentencing” (left)            “Health Kits” (center)       “Prosecution Resources” (right) 
 
 
* Vignette-specific results on Likert scale, with the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals of the 




Table 6: Regressions for Perceptions of Trust 
C0 vs. C1: 
 





Providing numbers does not increase trust at all, and in the “evidence-based sentencing” 
vignette, subjects rated trust slightly lower (on average) with Numbers (C1) than when No 
Number (C0) was provided (in this case, no risk score provided); the inclusion of the risk score 
lowered trust 0.3 points on the Likert scale (p-value 0.003), as seen in * Vignette-specific results on 
Likert scale, with the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals of the effect size for the contrast 




Table 6: Regressions for Perceptions of Trust. For the other two vignettes, there appears 
to be a tendency for uncertainty expressions to slightly decrease, rather than increase source 
trust perceptions, although these do not cross a .05 significance level.  
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It is possible that the lack of findings indicates that information, quantitative or 
otherwise, may not be the dominant signal or most important factor for signaling trustworthiness. 
Indeed, name recognition, for example, has been shown to have more prominent effects in other 
contexts (and is what interviewees in the interview study stress as well). In these fictional 
vignettes, I did not account or test for these potential effects. Further, one-shot scenarios such as 
done here will be limited in gauging credibility. For the time being, it is only possible to say that 
increases to source trust due to disclosing uncertainty did not replicate. 
 
5.3 Study Limitations 
This study was an initial effort to test whether minor differences in language about data 
uncertainty would change mean decisions and perceptions of trust. In this first step, I have not 
tested the mechanisms that may be driving any observed efforts.  
 
With respect to the observed effects, theory provided the guiding logic to the language 
proposed for each intervention. However, precise wording of each treatment condition could 
have influenced the findings, for example, the different effects seen for T2 and T4 in the “health 
kits” scenario but not in the others. For this reason, a next step would be to test conceptually 
equivalent treatments in other scenarios. This would provide further evidence about the 
robustness and reliability of whether the effects found here depend on the specific vignettes, or 
alternatively, if they hold across multiple scenarios.  
 
Finally, asking laypersons (online M-Turk workers) to imagine themselves in the position 
of an advisor to an organization is an imperfect measure. This population does not represent the 
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many contextual factors at play for many of the audiences that human rights practitioners try to 
inform or influence. Laypersons likely do not have the contextual knowledge and pressures of 
real decision-makers to influence their decisions. For example, Kahan et al. (2016) found that 
professionals tend to be less swayed by the motivated reasoning heuristics than laypeople. Thus, 
it will be ideal to conduct this study with professionals in addition to laypersons. This initial 
study strongly suggests that it may be worthwhile to attempt the challenging study among 
professional decision-makers.  
5.4 Conclusion 
In this study, I investigate a question at the heart of the human rights fact-finding debate: 
how can human rights practitioners that report numeric information prone to underreporting and 
bias “be transparent” about the data’s limitations, and what is the potential impact of doing so.  
 
The main results are as follows: First, I confirm that numbers do indeed serve as strong 
signals to influence decision outcomes consistently. Second, I find that at least among the 
messages I tried, only messages that make specific recommendations about how to counteract 
bias in the decision task consistently attenuate decisions that would otherwise be highly 
influenced by numbers. Third, in the first attempt to rigorously determine whether simple caveats 
about numbers have any impact on decision-making, I found no evidence for caveats having an 
effect. Fourth, I also found little evidence that perceptions of trust increase through a range of 
attempts at transparency when reporting uncertain numbers – in fact if anything, the results are 




Given that simple caveats are the closest message type to those seen used in human rights 
reports, these findings have important implications for practitioners. Those who produce and 
present information have deep knowledge about data production and could serve their audiences 
well by being more explicit not only about the data they do have, but also about data that is likely 
missing. Doing so may help their audiences comprehend and calibrate on the basis of 
information effectively. Given evidence that simple caveats do not appear to signal information 
nor credibility, their widespread use in human rights should be revisited. Finally, I believe these 
insights have far-reaching implications, as there is nothing inherently dependent on these results 
being about crime and violence data. I recommend such uncertainty messages should be tested in 
other contexts where numbers about hard-to-observe phenomena are in high supply and demand. 
 
Going forward, more research should be done to test whether human rights practitioners 
are willing to include messages that communicate bias explicitly in their reports. Findings from 
the qualitative interviews suggest that this will likely be a political decision, as any benefits to 
conveying uncertainty will be weighed against the pragmatic and political costs of doing so. 
However, advocates --as well as scientists and many others – also convey data for many 
purposes where those concerns are not present in the same way. There may be many other 
situations in which advocates and others will want to convey uncertainty effectively and the 
results in this experimental study can support those moments. For example, in the criminal-
sentencing context included in one the vignettes, the main human-rights-related concern is 
precisely that decision-makers will over-rely on the data in ways that magnify underlying biases. 
Advocates here can draw on the findings in this study to encourage improved uncertainty 
communication for criminal justice decisionmakers.  
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Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion 
I set out to understand the viability and impact of a common petition: for human rights 
advocates to “transparently communicate” data uncertainty. My findings contribute to the 
growing scholarship taking a critical look at the use of human rights statistics.  
 
The study is prefaced on the inherent uncertainty of human rights violations data and 
inquires how this fact shapes human rights information politics and data-informed decision-
making. I conducted a mixed-methods study consisting of: (1) qualitative interviews with human 
rights advocates to understand how they think about the value and impact of making quantitative 
claims and how they manage the associated uncertainty when using numbers to inform and 
influence audiences; and (2) a complementary survey experiment to test theoretically-informed 
hypotheses about the impact of different ways of communicating data uncertainty to people that 
make decisions on the basis of the information.  
 
As a whole, I find that human rights advocates must make trade-offs about how to 
manage the uncertainty. In this chapter, I first bring together my key findings from the interviews 
and the survey experiment, elaborating on how they relate to existing scholarly literature. I then 
offer a novel framework which I call the “rigor-pragmatism continuum.” The continuum enables 
a more productive analysis of the various trade-offs faced by human rights advocates, and it also 
re-interprets previous debates about human rights data. I will discuss some of the political and 
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practical implications of my research for human rights advocates and others presenting uncertain 
numbers to audiences. I close with directions for future research that build upon this work.  
 
6.1 Key Findings 
1. Data uncertainty is an unavoidable reality in human rights work, and human 
rights advocates are keenly aware of this. 
 
Advocates experience a palpable tension between the high advocacy value ascribed to 
numbers and “data uncertainty.” Advocates unabashedly confess the political utility of 
presenting uncertain numbers as an advocacy tool and their willingness to use it. At the same 
time, they have deep awareness of limitations, bias, and gaps in the data – and they contend 
with them, as we have seen.  
 
While many scholars have previously found the performative utility of flawed 
numbers for advocacy (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Best, 2012; Cohen & Green, 2012; Root, 
2016), I believe they too often jump to harsh conclusions. For example, “Peter Andreas and 
Kelly M. Greenhill see only one problem: these numbers are probably false” (book abstract), 
and Cohen and Green see the incentive for advocates to produce “suspect facts” (p.446). 
However, this line of reasoning leaves unaddressed that fact-based evidence about people 
killed in conflict, victims of rape, hate crimes, and other data about such hard-to-document 
phenomena are and will remain inherently uncertain. Furthermore, I find that such previous 
work has paid to little attention to how advocates themselves handle the tension between high 
data demand and uncertain data supply. Through my interviews, I find that the advocates 
interviewed do not simply ignore or discount data problems, publishing any big, attention-
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grabbing figure available. Instead, they make highly pragmatic, yet principled choices and 
trade-offs about how they ultimately use uncertain numbers in their communication 
strategies. Those trade-offs, which I find to be highly context-specific and elaborate further 
below, involve time, resources, expertise, and rigor, among other things.  
 
2. Human rights advocates are generally conscientious about wanting to avoid 
“suspect facts,” and one key way they do this is by making use of good enough 
numbers. 
 
While a few organizations in this study strive to use rigorous statistical methods to 
produce robust and reliable numbers, most of the advocates I spoke with expressed consistent 
and shared ideas about more pragmatic, yet principled alternatives. For example, they hedge 
their numeric reports with phrases such as “at least” or “no more than” – claims they can 
make with high confidence. Akin to the notion of “satisficing” (Simon, 1956), I call these 
good enough numbers and argue the ideas underlying them constitute a set of pragmatic 
ethical and political norms shaping human rights information politics in the advocacy space.  
While advocates know good enough numbers to be uncertain, they insist that they are 
temporary, conservative, and empirically-based – not exaggerated or unfounded guesses. As 
such, advocates differentiate these claims as “snapshots,” not robust “truth-claims.” 
Interestingly, while transparency about data and methods is discussed as an ideal for good 
enough numbers, it mostly exists as a tradeoff. Language about methodology, data 
provenance, and data limitations is often minimal, as discussed in detail below.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Porter’s definition of objectivity is specifically about 
“distance from subjectivity” which is achieved through a systematic process of data 
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production. He emphatically distinguishes objectivity from ideas about “truth in nature.” I 
find that human rights advocates intuitively share this conception when they reason about 
using good enough numbers. They consciously use the performative power of numbers, even 
where the numbers are not certain. They are comfortable that hedged presentations of 
numbers are ethical and valid in the short-term and come with minimal cost.  
 
These findings are also worth considering alongside Sally Merry’s work (2016) about 
the “seductions of quantification” of human rights indicators. Arguably, there are some 
important similarities in the value of quantification for advocates included in this study as 
Merry finds among policymakers included in her study, not least that the seduction mostly 
relies on the suppression of uncertainty. However, the seduction differs in this context in one 
important way. In her study, very much in accordance with Porter’s Trust in Numbers, Merry 
concludes that “[quantitative] indicators offer a particularly reliable form of truth” (p.26). 
Again, in this conception, quantification as a technology of distance is meant to project 
technocratic truth, cleansed of the subjectivity associated with politics. In the advocacy 
space, however, the politics is very much front and center – even with numbers. Among my 
advocate participants, most were conscious that they were using numbers less to make robust 
and reliable ‘truth-claims” and more for an immediate goal of getting attention. 
 
3. Human rights advocates consider political and cognitive risks of transparency. 
Most calculate that minimal transparency aligns with audiences’ expectations, 
thus poses little risk to them.  
 
In my interviews, advocates portray transparency – of methods and data uncertainty – as 
a frustrated ideal. Advocates and human rights scholars both underscore its value for credibility 
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(Ball & Price, 2019; Cohen & Green, 2012; Satterthwaite & Simeone, 2016). Yet, their 
incentives run counter to elaborate transparency. Most interviewees believe their audiences are 
not interested in methodological elaboration. Results from my survey experiment largely confirm 
these intuitions. Only one uncertainty message – expert interception (T3) – had any impact on 
the decisions subjects made with numbers. Furthermore, there was minimal fluctuation in the 
trust measure across treatments and controls with any of the different uncertainty messages. 
Overall, while methodological transparency may be an ideal, transparency does not appear to be 
a game changer with respect to trust in the source.  
 
Some participants even feared that too much transparency could be politically risky and 
cognitively complex, aligning with Merry’s finding in global governance forums, that “[i]n order 
for an indicator to succeed in policy and public domains, it must present information in a simple 
and unambiguous way without a great deal of qualification and methodological discussion” 
(p.20). In light of these findings, it was not surprising to find little reference to data limitations 
among the twelve randomly selected Human Rights Watch reports that I analyzed. In human 
rights work, robust transparency is not sought after, and there is little cost to avoiding it. 
 
While skeptics may interpret the ideas underlying low transparency to be self-serving for 
advocates, they very much echo previous findings from across science communication domains. 
In politicized contexts like climate change and tobacco policy, Oreskes & Conway  (2010) find 
high political risks to conveying scientific uncertainty. Similar to the idea of “seduction,” Manski 
finds a “lure of incredible certitude’ for most scientific claims made in public policy forums 
more generally (2018). Decades of research suggests that when presenting science in politicized 
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contexts, it is most “effective” to maximize audiences limited attention, leaving little room for 
methodological discussion and caveats (Lupia, 2013).  
 
My experimental findings also support and extend the insights from cognitive research. 
As reviewed earlier, studies show that some specific kinds of presentations can ease the effortful 
thinking required to bypass cognitive heuristics, thereby supporting “more effective” decision-
making with uncertainty (Fernandes et al., 2018; Joslyn & LeClerc, 2013; Kadane & Koehler, 
2018; K. A. Martire et al., 2013). The one message that moved decision-making away from an 
anchoring number was explicit about the impact of the bias on the decision task. This result 
replicates the findings from Joslyn and LeClerc (2013), adding weight to the evidence that 
“preferred deterministic interpretations” do affect information consumers.  
 
Less direct treatments (i.e., a simple caveat expressing the data were unrepresentative 
(T1), rich background information about the data production and its biases (T2), and numerical 
confidence intervals indicating the direction and degree of the data bias (T4)) did not have 
consistently significant effects on shifting decision means away from the numerical anchor (as 
compared to control across three vignettes). Of note, across all three vignettes, differences 
between decisions made in the “simple caveat” condition versus those made with a “number, no 
uncertainty” were consistently very small, the weakest at attenuating the anchoring power of the 
number. By failing to reject the null hypothesis of C1=T1, the experimental results leave intact 
the idea of the “caveat fallacy” (Ball, 2016) – i.e., that simply warning people that a number may 
be unrepresentative causes little change to the ensuing decision making. This finding is also 
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consistent with Jenson (2008), who found that hedges have little effect on what readers 
understand about broader findings presented in the science journalism context. 
 
4. “Expert interception” – the message that most consistently moves people away 
from a biased, anchoring number – intentionally asks audiences to accept data 
producers’ expert opinion about data limitations instead of mechanically placing 
their trust in the numbers.  
 
A key feature of the “expert interception” message (T3) is that it conveys the 
uncertainty as it specifically relates to the imminent decision. To do so, it explicitly draws on 
the data producer’s expert knowledge about the shortcomings in the data and uses that 
knowledge to anticipate and warn the decision-maker. In their discussion about why such a 
message type was “effective,” Joselyn and LeClerc emphasize its context-specificity, but I 
believe we gain added insights from Porter. Recall that Porter finds quantification to be a 
valuable communication tool when trust in the subjective authority of an information 
provider is weak. Perhaps a corollary to this finding is that numbers exert less power when 
subjective authority is strongly projected to counter the number.  
 
In the T3 condition, the information provider is essentially communicating a 
subjective yet expert signal to audiences that they should err on the side of trusting their 
expertise about the data limitations instead of heuristically trusting and mechanically 
accepting the numbers as valid. In this way, both the number and the expertise of the 
information provider exert authority, and the decision-maker bears the onus of whether they 




One could imagine that a choice to formulate the message in this way depends on 
how much the information provider believes the audiences is receptive to a heavy expert 
hand. In the human rights advocacy domain, one could imagine that such an explicit message 
aiming to shift trust in numbers toward trust in experts may undermine the rhetorical appeal 
of simple and unambiguous numbers.  
 
5. At least in human rights advocacy contexts, trust in institutional authority can 
matter more than quantitative expertise.  
 
As seen in the qualitative interviews, I find that the perception of the institutional source 
authority is cited as the key heuristic advocates use to evaluate and cite numbers produced by 
others. Advocates admit they rarely verify the quantitative expertise behind numbers they are 
willing to cite if they recognize the source is offering good enough numbers. In these cases, 
avoiding reputational risk when citing numbers’ produced by others sometimes means making 
political calculations about citing “official sources” and other times means relying on trusted 
institutions in human rights community. In such cases, the risk is assumed to rest primarily with 
the authoritative source being cited.  
 
Porter explains that trust in numbers is a powerful force precisely because they 
communicate complex information in a simplified form. As audiences engage in such trust, they 
assume the numbers were produced according to expert, rule-based quantification procedures. 
But the unambiguous presentation of numbers itself does not convey that the assumption of rule-
following was met. To avoid having to deal with the verification process (which would be 
difficult to conduct anyway given how little methodological information is said to accompany 
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most numbers), advocates shift to citing authoritative sources that for the various reasons 
presented above, absorb the perceived potential risk to the citers’ reputation.  
 
6. Advocates face a clear choice to be made between allowing numbers to speak for 
themselves or being proactive about mitigating bias.  
 
Based on the evidence from the experimental survey, which demonstrates a substantive 
and consistent difference between C1 (number-only control) and T3 (expert interception), it 
becomes clear that information providers face a clear choice about whether to use an uncertain 
number and about the extent to which they will support the audience to understand the bias and 
limitations in a number. Because the “expert interception” message seeks to correct for the ways 
the data bias may impact decision-making, human rights communicators are necessarily making 
a choice between letting the number speak for itself, and intentionally correcting it. There is no 
technocratic truth, especially under uncertainty. So if advocates, or any information provider, 
believe it is important for audiences not to interpret a number with a false sense of precision, 
they must exert their data expertise and convey the bias explicitly.  
6.2 A Rigor-Pragmatism Continuum 
The findings above suggest we need a new model to analyze the practical trade-offs that 
advocates face when they consider using uncertain data to advance their work – a model that 
moves beyond the dichotomous good/bad framing. I propose a continuum, with rigor at one end 
and pragmatism at the other. Rigor refers to the effort made to adhere to the rules of a system 
(Marquart, 2017), and in this context, the effort made to reach and express the full, unvarnished 
truth as far as it can be known. Pragmatism, as a philosophy, is an approach that assesses the 
validity of specific ideas by the consequences of their practical outcomes (Peirce, 1966). On such 
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a continuum, anyone can undertake choices and gauge potential costs that pull them towards 
rigor on one end and pragmatism in the opposite direction.  
 
A valuable quality of the rigor-pragmatism framework is that the full spectrum has 
validity in context. Rigor is valid for its stress on truth; pragmatism is valid for its emphasis on 
utility and action. This reframes the prevailing debates about numbers in human rights, which 
tend to judge them as “good” or “bad” (Best 2012; Andreas & Greenhill, 2010). The rigor-
pragmatism continuum is better-suited to understanding and interpreting human rights numbers, 
because very few in the community put out outright “bad” numbers – instead, my participants 
regularly and conscientiously wrestled with how and when to use less-than-perfect numbers. 
This model can be extended and enhanced in future work. 
 
Some of the ideas inherent to the rigor-pragmatism continuum have similarities to the 
points Sheila Jasaonoff offers the idea of “serviceable truths,” which refer to scenarios where 
science is meant to support reasoned decision-making in policy spheres (2014). This often 
requires understanding that the standards to which science-inflected claims are held are more 
practical than they would be in pure scientific communities that depend on the “sharp critical 
gaze” of methodological peers (p.1738). She urges scholars that study science-in-policy domains 
to go beyond analyzing science in action (focused on analyzing how the facts get made) to 




I believe that in the human rights advocacy realm, we see a similar “serviceable” standard 
in operation.89 The rigor-pragmatism continuum that I propose here paves the way for a more 
nuanced analysis of how advocates pursue satisfactory alternatives to using uncertain data that 
go beyond conducting rigorous statistical analyses or abandoning the use of such data altogether 
(what I called the “fix the data” or “drop the data” in Chapter 2: Literature and Theoretical 
Framework).  
                                               
89 In the human rights scholarship, there is a larger debate about human rights practice becoming ever-more pragmatic (see 
Dancy, 2016; Sharp, 2018). In their increasing use of quantification – and especially highly uncertain numbers – this study offers 
a data point in favor of some highly pragmatic practices by human rights advocates. 
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Rigor --------------------------------------------------------------- Pragmatism 
 
Table 7: Data uncertainty forces trade-offs on a rigor-pragmatism continuum for many 
issues involved in producing and presenting numbers 
 
Issue on Continuum Rigor Pragmatism 
Goal advanced by numbers 
 Truth claims Rhetorical claims 
Temporal robustness of 
numerical claim  
 
Enduring Temporary 
Reliability of numbers  
 Higher Lower 
Context applicability 
 More contexts Context-specific 




Resource required for analysis 
 Higher Lower 
Quantitative expertise required 
to produce numbers 
 
Higher Lower 
Perceived risk of push-back 
about data uncertainty  
 
Higher Lower 
Who bears onus of uncertainty 
 Communicator Others 





I have included in the table a range of topics that advocates brought up during interviews 
that they consider as they use uncertain data for advocacy. The first issue refers to the goal 
sought – whereby advocates differentiated between pursing “truth” claims with science to 
pursing more persuasive end by drawing on numbers in a performative way. Temporal 
robustness distinguishes between claims meant to endure over time versus claims that are 
deliberately meant to be “snapshots,” as many advocates expressed. Reliability of numbers refer 
to the extent to one can arrive at the same results when repeating the procedure that produced the 
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result, which may rely on stable and knowable data and procedures. Context applicability is an 
especially important issue in the table, as it refers to the degree to which the numeric claim is 
valid in a specific context versus to its validity across contexts (I return to this in more detail 
below). Time, resources and quantitative expertise all involve degrees of effort and material 
costs. Anticipated push-back refers to the extent to which communicators foresee and prepare for 
methodological critique from potential audiences. Who bears the onus of uncertainty refers to the 
extent to which communicators view themselves as liable for the uncertainty inherent to the 
claims (and opt for rigorous methods to contend with it), versus the extent to which they shift 
that responsibility either to the institutional sources they cite or to the audiences that may have to 
deal with any interpretation and use of uncertain numbers. Finally, while transparency is often 
coupled with rigor, this study shows how it is also better understood on a spectrum, i.e., one can 
have more or less of it.  
 
My experiment also tested different versions of transparency implementations which 
could be gauged along the same spectrum. Again, a key finding here is that the degree and form 
of transparent communication of uncertainty will be context-specific and clearly involves trade-
offs with some of the other items in this table. “Total” transparency can be considered more 
rigorous while pragmatism might dictate conciseness or vagueness. 
 
Among the strengths and reasoning I heard from some interviewees for opting for more 
rigor is that numeric claims about human rights violations should “speak truth to power.” As 
such, they should be more enduring and robust across contexts. As a result, they will require 
relatively higher effort (expertise, time, resources) to produce. When a communicator opts for 
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rigor, perhaps by privileging in-house statistical expertise or out-sourcing such work, they also 
accept greater responsibility and thus accept accountability about the impact of the uncertainty 
on the claims they make. Groups that opt for this level of effort often limit the contexts for which 
they do so to those they consider “high-stakes,” such as when they want the data to inform 
policy, when they anticipate resistance from adversaries (political, legal, or public opinion), or 
when they aim to make more long-lasting empirical contributions (e.g., truth commissions). Only 
a few organizations represented in this study aim towards this level of rigor in their production 
and presentation of uncertain numbers.  
 
At the same time, rigor absolutists should also recognize the trade-offs that pull towards 
pragmatic options about how to contend with data uncertainty. By far, the majority of human 
rights advocates in this study make choices that pull toward the pragmatic end of this spectrum, 
doing what they can for rigor, but making concessions so as to achieve advocacy goals within the 
time and resources they have.  As these advocates think about using the rhetorical power of 
“good enough” numbers, they choose to expend relatively low effort and resources to 
transparently communicate uncertainty.  
 
Theoretically, pulling towards pragmatism in the use of quantification as a 
communication tool is consistent with Porter. He finds much idiosyncrasy and pragmatism in the 
production and presentation of numbers in very different contexts. However, among the highest 
tradeoff I see in good enough numbers is their ephemeral validity, as “snapshots” in time. 
Indeed, the idea of temporary numbers defies the nature and power of numbers – not only do 
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they have longevity and fluidity across contexts, but among the greatest concerns with their 
misuse is that they are taken out of contexts (Best, 2012).  
 
Advocates mostly see near-term attention goals over long-term use and reuse of numbers. 
However, advocates violate these assumptions all the time. They themselves may reuse an 
existing number not as a temporary claim (for example, about the known number of victims to 
date) but as a reference point to claim that violence is escalating, the context-specificity of the 
original number is breached. When making such claims about changes over time or other 
patterns of interest (which we saw is another of the main goals for advocates), the initial number 
becomes a hard data point used for comparing time past with time present. A context violation in 
this way can occur by a single author using information in different ways in two different 
moments (e.g., a cautious claim of magnitude in moment one and as a hard reference frame in an 
over-time comparison in moment two). Another kind of context violation with uncertain 
numbers is while they may have low cost in general advocacy contexts, they easily become 
consequential anchors in subsequent decision-making forum (such as the scenarios included as 
vignettes in the survey experiment). Therefore, the short-term utility of “good enough” numbers 
contrasts with their long-term staying and anchoring power. As a result, future users may bear 
the onus of not being aware of or being able to warn users of data uncertainty because it fell 
away in earlier moments of publication.  
 
Andreas and Greenhill (2010) close their book with the following: “Yet however much 
one may try to rationalize the political uses of bad data, a failure to at least strive for, if not 
achieve, statistical accuracy and honesty tends to be not only unhelpful, but can deepen public 
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cynicism and distrust and erode credibility” (p. 272). While, as is clear by now, I disagree with 
the “bad” data characterization, I nonetheless agree that striving for the rigorous end of the 
spectrum is worthwhile. Rigor should matter not least because of the influential anchoring effects 
of numbers, but also because the idea of narrow-conceived numbers for advocacy contexts is 
unrealistic. To the extent possible, investing in rigorous practices – including investing in well-
established ways to make data-based inferences and being transparent about data limitations – is 
worthwhile. While it will always be impossible to reach, rigor can be a North Star pulling the 
community in more robust and transparent directions.  
 
6.3 Refining Appeals to Rigor, Transparency, and Credibility  
As we have seen, in recent years human rights scholars have cast a critical eye to the use 
of numbers in human rights advocacy. Almost unanimously, they emphasize that advocates 
should strive to be more rigorous and more transparent. Beyond the findings and continuum 
offered here, this research sheds light on the limitations of existing appeals and suggests ways to 
improve them. 
 
At present, appeals to rigor and transparency take at least three forms. Some scholars 
appeal to the interest of organizational credibility (Cohen & Green, 2012; Satterthwaite & 
Simeone, 2016). For example, Satterthwaite and Simone write: “Greater transparency and rigor 
will ultimately enhance [advocates’] credibility with target audiences” (p.322). While my study 
does not discredit such ideas, per se, it also does not find that opacity necessarily leads to loss of 
credibility. In the experiment, we see that trust in sources does not appear to be highly associated 
with the presentation of numbers and uncertainty. In the interviews, advocates mostly did not 
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raise credibility penalties in any examples they provide on the use of uncertain numbers. They 
hint at judging credibility and gauging trust in numbers based on other metrics (e.g. political 
position or institutional standing of the source), although further research is needed to understand 
what generates institutional trust in the human rights community, including laypersons trust in 
institutions and trust across peer organizations within the community. Meanwhile, advocates 
make pragmatic trade-offs to protect concerns about source trust and credibility.  
 
Others scholars makes appeals to rigor by citing that inaccurate numeric claims can lead 
to dire potential consequences for truth and accountability (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Ball & 
Price, 2019). However, such appeals for more rigorous methods to better approximate “truth” 
may fail to resonate with advocates that believe “good enough” numbers – numbers based on 
data that they believe to be and clearly state to be lower bounds – suffice for near-term advocacy. 
What becomes clear in the interviews is that truth-seeking and activists goals are important, yet 
different; data uncertainty forces a trade-off about what to seek in a given context. Therefore, 
while advocates in this study would likely agree with appeals to rigor for truth-seeking, such 
appeals may ultimately be weak motivators to change advocacy communication practices.  
 
Finally, to motivate critical information consumption, some of the existing literature 
either explicitly or implicitly characterizes uncertain data as “bad” data and the lack of rigor and 
transparency in the use of it as “misuse.” They leave a subtext portraying information providers 
as suspect a priori. Sometimes scholars must include awkward clarifications to suggest that is not 
necessarily what they are implying.90 Such appeals would serve information providers and 
                                               




information consumers better if in their appeals, they recognized the contentious trade-offs 
involved in information presentation, where good enough numbers with low transparency is 
largely seen to be working.  
 
While valuing the complex tradeoffs that advocates make to advance their agendas, my 
appeal is for advocates to more seriously contend with the fact that numbers will not be 
constricted to the temporary and context-specific bounds within which they are originally 
published. The short-term utility of “good enough” numbers contrasts with the unavoidable 
fluidity, anchoring effect, long-term staying power and reuse of numbers. For this primary 
reason, I believe advocates could consider conveying data provenance and limitations to a 
greater extent than they currently do. At least in the experiment included here, we see little 
penalties to trust in the information provider when including any of the uncertainty messages.   
 
Ultimately advocates and any other information provider about human rights abuses face 
a choice about how much to communicate data uncertainty underlying the numbers they publish 
to near-term and long-term users. The choice may be hard. In the near-term, advocates may 
reason that they have more to lose than to gain by transparently communicating methods and 
data uncertainty (as many interviewees expressed). But it is worth pausing for a moment and 
considering future users. Would the interpretation of this number as a hard anchor (which is 
likely) by future users be problematic? If so, can they design expert interception language to 
mitigate the risk to future users? Or can they convey uncertainty with rich background language 




In the process of investigating the challenges and possibilities of conveying uncertainty in 
advocacy and decision-making scenarios, this research opens many more questions. Hopefully 
future research can help us understand the specific impact of using language to communicate 
uncertainty in real-world contexts that brings together the political and cognitive insights, as well 
as the challenge of uncertainty communication that serves near and long-term users. Considering 
potential future users of uncertain information is important for several reasons. For one, 
advocates know the numeric information to have an uncertain relationship to the issues they 
represent. It is important because numbers endure over time and across contexts. It is important 
because numbers have an outsized impact on their readers whether to impel attention (as seen in 
interviews) or to anchor decisions (as seen in the experiment). And, it is important because here 
the numbers in question are about human rights atrocities – information with an expansive and 
diverse set of stakeholders (ranging from immediate victims and families, to future generations 
seeking answers about what happened and who did what to whom). In sum, my appeal is to 
include information about data uncertainty for posterity. 
 
6.4 Study Limitations and Future Research 
The survey experiment on communicating data uncertainty conducted here is the first of 
its kind in the human rights literature. It was useful to begin by conducting an initial study that 
tested whether the conceptual interventions had any significant impacts on outcome measures 
among laypersons. To do so, I focused in this experiment on designing vignettes and 
interventions (treatments) that were consistent with scholarly insights from science 
communication and human rights scholarship and practice. While I used previous scholarship to 
guide my logic to the language proposed for the interventions, precise wording of each treatment 
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condition may have influenced the answers provided. For this reason, I included multiple 
vignettes covering different human rights contexts where quantitative data is used to inform or 
influence the information consumer. This enabled me to detect whether the effect of a given 
presentation of data uncertainty treatment depends on a given vignette, or alternatively, if it is 
relatively stable across vignettes.  
Nonetheless, the experiment was limited in several ways. First, asking laypersons (online 
M-Turk workers) to imagine themselves in the position of professional decision-makers is an 
imperfect measure. This population does not represent the many contextual factors at play for 
many of the audiences that human rights practitioners try to inform or influence. Laypersons 
likely do not have the contextual knowledge and pressures of real decision-makers to influence 
their decisions. Research from other domains suggest some experts are less affected by framing 
effects (Gächter, Orzen, Renner, & Starmer, 2009), and that professionals are less swayed by 
motivated reasoning (Kahan et al., 2016). Going forward, it will be ideal to conduct this study 
with professionals in addition to laypersons, although recruiting a sufficient sample size with 
internal validity could be challenging. Ideally such a study could test not only how uncertainty 
messages are received (as tested in this dissertation), but also how willing real-world 
practitioners are to send such messages.  
Also, while we gain evidence of that “expert interception” (T3) was the uncertainty 
message most “effective” at shifting decision means consistently and significantly, we need more 
work to experimentally isolate why treatments did or did not have an effect, especially why two 
of the experimental conditions produced different results across vignettes. This could be done 
with additional hypotheses and round of iterative experiments, as detailed in Chapter 5. For 
example, for T2 (“rich background”), we do not yet know if this treatment was ignored 
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altogether, or was considered and discarded as information that merited a different decision from 
what it would have been in the absence of this information.  
A future study would also further benefit from some of the insights from the qualitative 
interview study to a greater degree. For one, it could try to more carefully distinguish “simple 
caveats” from “estimative” language – like “at least” – which is what advocates say they attempt 
to communicate and what I found was most used in the small coding exercise of HRW reports. 
Also, given that advocates believe one of the greatest potential costs to communicating 
uncertainty is reduced perception of them as an authority, a future study could refine and 
disaggregate measures for such impacts. Finally, a future study could also aim to test which 
messages best support reusing numbers in different and future contexts, while simultaneously 
minimizing losses to source trust in the present. For example, such a study could test whether a 
message type like T2 “rich background” would be adopted by a presenter and support a reuser in 
a different time and space than that which the number was presented for in the first place.  
 
The main limitation of the qualitative research is that it was based on a small convenience 
sample of key informants and thus cannot represent the community’s views as a whole. As 
Creswell (2013) points outs, interviews gave me as researcher the advantage of control over the 
line of questioning to purse and dive in depth as appropriate for each interviewee. Nonetheless, 
the quality of data collected may be varied. Given that I already had a professional relationship 
with some of the people I recruited, I may have gotten a different level of disclosure from some 
people compared to others. Interviews are always shaped by different levels of trust and comfort 
interviewees may have felt with me as researcher. I am also cognizant of possible social 
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desirability effects, expectancy effects, the inaccuracy of self-reporting, degradation of memory 
over time, and the deference effect.  
A larger and more representative sample would enable more reliable results. Nonetheless, 
for now the qualitative study here offered the insights that I used to propose the rigor-
pragmatism as a kind of prototype model that I hope will be useful as an analytic framework. To 
test the utility and robustness of the continuum as an analytic framework, a more diverse study 
would be valuable, expanded along many other important factors influencing HR advocates – 
other geographies, different levels of institutional hierarchy within organizations, more diversity 
in the resources of organizations, and different levels of adversity the organizations perceive 
from their audiences – especially because these are key trade-offs in the continuum.  Finally, the 
coding exercise of HRW reports is preliminary and thus limited. A more comprehensive study 
could use the coding model developed here, but include a larger sample of reports from more 
organizations and more periods of time.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
With this research, I have shed light on the political, behavioral, and methodological 
challenges that advocates face as they collect, communicate, and deploy violence statistics in 
global and local human rights advocacy contexts. Informed by the results of this research, the 
rigor-pragmatism continuum hopes to serve as a more nuanced analytic framework than what 
good versus bad framings support about how human rights advocates wrestle with using 




As we appreciate the tradeoffs advocates must make with using uncertain numbers in 
context, we can also see some weaknesses with such communication strategies. Results from the 
survey experiment make clear that numbers are not read in the way advocates believe they are 
presenting them. The notion that numbers are temporary and performative statements contrast 
with their numeric anchoring power and their endurance long past immediate advocacy contexts. 
The experiment, on the one hand, confirms advocates’ intuition that most messages about data 
limitations have little impact on outcomes. On the other hand, it offers evidence that with one 
specific message formulation, what I have called “expert interception,” communicators of 
information can intervene and attenuate the interpretation of numbers, if they so choose. Perhaps 
easing concerns about risks to the source credibility, the experiment finds that trust in the 
information providers is largely unaffected by any of the forms of conveying data uncertainty.  
 
However, such messaging requires communicators to take the position of data experts 
and use their knowledge to inform readers of how data limitations can bias outcomes. 
Intercepting the power of numbers to project “mechanical objectivity” with expert knowledge 
about the data generation process and data limitations could be politically risky in domains 
where experts are seen as suspect, but arguably there are many cases where these findings can 
help convey data uncertainty, for human rights contexts and much beyond (e.g., climate science 
and public health). Whether information providers choose to include such messages will 
ultimately depend on if they believe it is important to mitigate bias by future users, requiring a 





Appendix A: Interview Protocol for Qualitative Study 
 
General questions about their work 
 
• Tell me about your current position and area of expertise within the organization. 
o How did you come to your current position? (including: education, previous work 
experience, etc.) 
 
• Data production: Can you tell me about the fact-finding and documentation work at the 
organization?  
 
• How are you involved in that work?  
o Probe on the data generating processes. 
 
• Tell me more about your role in producing information about human rights violations – 
documenting, monitoring, collecting 
o Challenges? 
 
• Do you have experience actually conducting the quantitative data analysis by your 
organization?  
o If relevant, please describe a recent example. 
o How is this information used by you or your organization? 
 
Presenting data and quantitative claims in your work 
 
• Do you ever choose to incorporate numbers, patterns, quant arguments, data viz into your 
reports? Conversations? Advocacy in general?  
o Do you ever choose not to? 
 
• Are there specific audiences for whom you believe this appeal works? Any this appeal 
isn’t useful for? What other “types” of appeals for other audiences? (emotional, 
informational, stories, others?) 
 
• What do you perceive to be advantages in using quantitative evidence (metrics, numbers, 
aggregate data patterns) in messaging? 
 




• What you think presenting quantitative information uniquely helps you achieve?  
 
• Do you have any examples of times when you think statistics or quantitative claims were 
instrumental in achieving some intended outcome? Elaborate. Why was it successful? 
 
• Do you have any examples of any specific decision-making scenarios specifically 
influenced or able to influence with numbers? Something analogous to EBS? 
 
• Do you have any examples of times when you think the inclusion of statistics or 
quantitative claims in a publication or argument resulted in a problematic outcome? 
Elaborate. 
o What may have been a more favorable outcome?  
o Why? 
 
• Have you made any changes to how you (or your organization) presents quantitative data 
to inform and influence agendas over the past 5 years?  
o Why do you think it’s changed in this way? 
o Have those changes been successful? 
o Are there any weaknesses or drawbacks that have resulted from those changes?  
 
• What do you perceive to be disadvantages in using quantitative evidence (metrics, 
numbers, aggregate data patterns) in messaging? 
 
• Do you ever find the advantages and disadvantages in tension with each other? Explain. 
o Do you ever find that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages? Explain.  
 
• Do you ever think about the robustness or quality of the data underlying the quantitative 
messages you present? Data Limitations? 
o Have you ever had any concerns about presenting quantitative claims? 
 
• Do you ever include quantitative claims or arguments in your reports that were produced 
by a third-party (not produced by your organization)? Explain. 
o How do you select which metrics or findings to include? 
o How do you judge their credibility? 
 
Receiving and consuming quantitative claims: 
 
• Can you tell me about other sources where you see or from where you “receive” 
quantitative information about human rights violation from? I’m referring to processed 




• How do you assess the credibility of numerical claims and trends in human rights 
violations?  
o Probe: Do you ask/know author? About language? Do you gauge against what 
you already know about a given context?  
o Do you try to gauge “how hard they’ve worked”? 
o How might your assessment of credibility differ across contexts where you are 
more or less familiar with issue/country/other contexts?  
• Have you ever seen quantitative data in reports that you felt was weak or flawed? 
Explain. 
 
• Have you seen any changes in how others present quantitative data to inform and 
influence agendas over the past 5 years?  
o Why do you think it’s changed in this way? 
o Have those changes been successful? 
o Are there any weaknesses or drawbacks that have resulted from those changes?  
 
Probes about presenting data & uncertainty in their work 
 
• What do you usually present in a methods section of a report?  
o What do you hope that communicates? 
o When numeric data included in reports, statements, etc. – do you usually present 
how that data was collected? Any data limitations? 
 
• Are you aware of any limitations or weakness in the data you collect and/or present to 
your audience? 
o Are those limitations/weaknesses communicated to the audience? 
o Do you believe they should be? 
o Are there differences in how you present weaknesses to your different audiences? 
o Is there any specific terminology you often employ when communicating data 
weakness?  
 
• How does your presentation of information and its limitations differ between audiences, 
such as public and private reports? 
o Between potential adversaries and potential allies?  
 
• Has your expression of the origins of the data, or any uncertainty about what it includes 
or excludes ever posed any problems for your work?  
o If relevant, please describe a recent example. 
 
• In the literature, call for more transparency about data production. What do you 
understand this to mean? 
o What do you understand a caveat to be?  
o Do you use caveats when you present quantitative information? 
o To express what?  
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o How do you perceive caveats when you read them in reports by others? 
 
• Any downsides to presenting numbers in short and long-term? 
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Appendix B. Vignettes and Treatment Language 
 
Vignette 1: Health Kits for Wartime Sexual Violence 
 
Stop the Violence Now (SVN) is a non-profit agency dedicated to promoting human rights 
globally. We are headquartered in New York, but collaborate with local authorities around the world to 
eradicate violence and its effects.           
 
We are concerned about the long-term health of rape survivors. Studies show that survivors of 
sexual violence are more likely to experience mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, substance 
abuse, and post-traumatic stress disorder. They also have higher rates of illnesses like cancer, cardio-
vascular disease, and diabetes over their lifetimes.  
  
We have decided to provide post-rape care resources to victims of sexual violence in war-torn countries. 
These come in the form of “kits” – which include a bundle of professional services promoting physical 
and mental health, and social services.  
  
We will begin our provision of these kits in Colombia. This year, SVN’s offices documented increasing 
numbers of sexual violence in two distinct locations in the country. One is the large and remote Pacific 
region of Choco where there is still an armed conflict. The other is a displaced persons camp in the 
northern region of Sucre. We will distribute emergency health kits in these two regions.       
 
[* C1+ Treatment ] 
 
We aim to distribute our limited services to benefit as many victims of sexual violence as possible 
who arrive at the locations where we offer services. Often, we find that more people show up for services 
than official counts have tallied. 
  
We currently have the resources to fund 700 kits. We are seeking input on how to best distribute them.   
 
Based on the information provided here, please tell us how many of the 700 kits you would 





Table 8: Treatment language Vignette 1 
 
Treatment Name Uncertainty message [*] 
C0 No numbers [No C1 paragraph above] 
 
C1 Number, NO 
uncertainty 
In Choco we have 200 documented cases of sexual violence 
and in the Sucre displaced persons camp we have 400 
documented cases. 
C1+ T1 Simple Caveat Be aware that reporting sexual violence is culturally 
stigmatized in Colombia. Many people may choose not to 
report their experiences for fear of social consequences. 
C1+ T2 Rich 
Background  
In both regions of Colombia, people may avoid reporting 
sexual violence due to cultural stigma.       
 
In Choco, local government-run health clinics are doing 
their best to report known cases, yet there are very few of 
these clinics across the large region. More generally, data 
collection is challenging in a context where illegal armed 
groups continue to operate and use sexual violence as one 
way to repress the population.       
 
In Sucre, all the reported cases are from a relatively small 
displaced persons camp. There are several health clinics 
throughout the camp where people can get aid, and local 
officials make an effort to document all the sexual violence 
cases they learn about.                       
C1+ T3 Expert 
Interception 
Be aware that the reported cases of sexual violence are an 
undercount, and likely do not represent the total number nor 
the pattern of all sexual violence cases in both locations. 
While we cannot be sure, we may know about many more of 
the victims of sexual violence in the Sucre camp than we do 
about all victims in Choco.                        
      
In Choco, there are probably many more victims of sexual 
violence than are reported because the region is so large, 
precarious, and still has active armed groups. In Sucre, there 
may also be more victims than the reported number, yet the 
displaced persons camp is smaller, has administrators 
working around the clock, and is not located in an active 
conflict zone. 




[C1 embedded] In Choco we have 200 documented 
cases of sexual violence, but the total number could range to 
be anywhere between these 200 to 2,000 cases. In the Sucre 
displaced persons camp we have 400 documented cases, but 
the number of people who have suffered some form of 
sexual violence could be as high as 600. 
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Vignette 2: Prosecution Resources 
 
You are the Assistant to the Prosecutor at the Special War Crimes Court for the Northern African 
Republic. You need to advise the prosecutor on which war crimes cases to prioritize for investigation. 
 
The Northern African Republic had an outbreak of extreme ethnic violence last year in a conflict 
between the two ethnic groups – the ethnic majority Borano and the ethnic minority Kaya. The 
international community is concerned that Borano militias may have committed genocide against the 
Kaya minority.    
 
You are reviewing the evidence submitted to the Prosecutor’s Office by non-governmental 
organizations. Most of the evidence submitted comes from one organization, the African Peace, 
Empowerment and Rights Group (APERG). Last year, APERG led a fact-finding mission to the North 
African Republic for 2 months, during which they produced an extensive report detailing the human 
rights violations they observed. *In that report, APERG presents the names of civilians killed, which 
include people from both Kaya and Borano ethnic groups.                 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor has over 200 cases on file to investigate for violent events carried 
out by alleged perpetrators from both ethnic groups. However, they only have the resources to review 80 
cases in the foreseeable future. The cases require similar levels of effort and resources to prosecute. 
  
The Special Court always seeks to allocate their limited resources fairly, for example, by prioritizing 
cases in proportion to the level of victimization by ethnic group.   
   
In your job as Assistant to the Prosecutor, based on the information provided, consider how would you 
allocate the 80 cases across perpetrators targeting victims from each ethnic group.         
 
Of the 80 cases, type the number you would allocate to investigate cases involving victims of 
Borano ethnicity: _________ 
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Table 9: Treatment language Vignette 2 
Treatment Name Uncertainty message [*] 
C0 No numbers In that report, APERG presents the names of civilians 
killed, which include people from both Kaya and Borano 
ethnic groups.  
C1 Number, NO 
uncertainty 
In that report, APERG presents the names of just over 
3,600 Kaya civilians killed by Borano militias. These 
same investigators also documented 400 killings of 
Borano civilians by Kaya guerillas. 
C1+T1 Simple Caveat Be aware that APERG investigators could only document 
victims in areas where they had access, so all the figures 
are prone to underreporting.                    
C1+T2 Rich 
Background  
APERG's team collected their data during seven weeks of 
investigation in November and December of 2016, during 
a period of high violence. Their research team consisted of 
two foreign researchers, a British man and a Kenyan 
woman. They conducted interviews with hundreds of 
witnesses and victims of violence with help from local 
translators.                              
 
APERG had unprecedented access to interview people in 
the Southeast of the country, a region controlled by the 
Kaya (minority) armed opposition group. They also 
interviewed a few Borano government officials. They kept 
detailed interview notes and research logs, which became 
the basis of their report.    
C1+T3 Expert 
Interception 
It is likely that the evidence APERG collected does not 
represent the total number of victims nor the true pattern 
of civilian killings. The evidence they present in the report 
is based on the researchers’ available time, resources, and 
the level of access they were granted during their field 
work. Since they had the most access to a Kaya-controlled 
region, it is likely they know more about Kaya victims 
than Borano victims. There may be many more victims 






Using these data, statisticians produced statistical 
estimates that suggest total Kaya victims range between 
55,000 and 65,000, and that total Borano victims range 






Vignette 3: Evidence Based-Sentencing 
 
William dropped out of high school before graduating. He is now 22 years old living with his 
parents in a low-income housing project. He has developed a drinking problem, and his fed-up parents 
just told him he has until the end of the month to move out. He doesn’t know how he will afford living on 
his own; he has been studying for the GED (a test that certifies high school-level academic skills), but he 
recently failed the GED exam. The next day, frustrated, he walks through a local mall looking for “help 
wanted” signs when he notices that a display case in a jewelry store has been left open. William waits 
until the salesclerk is distracted by a customer, reaches in to the case and sweeps a shelf full of diamond 
bracelets and necklaces into his backpack. He quickly walks away, but his crime was recorded by a 
security camera, and he is soon arrested. He pleads guilty to felony grand larceny (crime of high-value 
theft) in the amount of $150,000.  
  
William’s parents immediately kick him out of the house after his arrest. At the time of sentencing, he has 
been staying mostly with his older brother and with a high school friend, both of whom are known gang 
affiliates with drug distribution records. According to William’s official Pre-sentence Report prepared by 
his probation officer, William has no prior felony convictions, but was convicted two years ago of 
misdemeanor drunk-and-disorderly conduct and underage-drinking charges.      
 
[*C1+ Treatment here] 
 
The statutory sentencing range for grand larceny in Michigan is 0 to 20 years' incarceration; 
actual sentences average 5 years, but they vary widely depending on the circumstances of the case.          
 
If you were the sentencing judge, based on the information provided, how long an incarceration 




(Type the number of years you think William should be sentenced to incarceration for his crime) 
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Table 10: Treatment language Vignette 3 
Treatment Name Uncertainty message [*] 
C0 No numbers [No C1 paragraph above] 
C1 Number, NO 
uncertainty 
William’s Pre-sentence Report includes his score on the 
Risk of Reoffending Prediction Instrument (RRPI), which 
calculates his probability to commit another crime within 
the next three years. Scores range between 1 and 10: scores 
between 1-4 are considered “low risk,” 5-7 are considered 
“moderate risk,” and 8-10 are considered “high-risk.” 
William’s RRPI score is 8, placing him in the "high risk" 
category.  
 
The RRPI was developed by criminologists and uses 
available data about other people who have recommitted 
crimes after a first offense. This includes past offenders’ 
age, criminal record, education, marital status, employment 
status, stability of housing, substance abuse history, and 
their association with other people who have criminal 
records. 
C1+T1 Simple Caveat Note: The RRPI scores are calculated using existing and 
available information about offenders known to the 
authorities and well as known re-offenses. Thus, the data 
used is likely not to represent all offenders and their 
behaviors.       
C1+T2 Rich 
Background  
Note: The data used to calculate the RRPI scores come 
from crime records available to authorities on people who 
have committed multiple crimes. The data include people 
who have been arrested by law enforcement officers, 
charged with a crime at one time, and then at a later date, 
re-identified and formally charged with another crime.   
 
To be included in the data, police officers must have 
witnessed or been alerted to each of the crimes. They must 
have then filed accurate reports for the multiple crime 
committed by the same offender. The data must be 
properly entered into police databases. Further, multiple 
crimes must be properly linked to the same 
person.                              
 
The data used to calculate the RRPI score are taken from 





Note: The data used to calculate the RRPI score come from 
available crime records on people who have committed 
multiple crimes over time. However, the available data 
may be biased, as they do not necessarily represent all 
offenders and their behaviors.  
 
We know, for example, that there are more data available 
about low-income offenders than high-income offenders 
who commit the same crimes. We also know that people 
with certain characteristics are arrested more often than 
other people for committing the same crimes.  
 
Given these biases in the available data, people from low-
income demographics are more likely to be classified as 





Note: Inaccuracies in the underlying data about past 
offenders, or minor differences in the defendant’s age or 
housing stability, could make William’s RRPI score be 
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